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Argentina  has  had  a qIualrter century  without  growth  at a time  of
rapid  econonmic  growthi  in the  rest  of  thle world  - and  govern-
ment  spendi ng systematically  grows  faster  than GDP  and exceeds
government  revenues.  Thle cenitral  bank  borrows  about  80 per-
cetit  of  the  private  banks'  lending  power.
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Argentina hias  had a quarter century without  percent of revenue f'rom creating moncy - the
growth  at a time of' rapid economic  growth  in thie  eff''ct  o 'collectitig which  is an additional  67.9
rest ol' the world and government spending  percent of inflation.
systematically grows fEster than GDP.  Spendinig
declined when the final crisis of thc Argenltine  Public debt plays a peculiar role in
economy began in 1982, but more because of'  Argentina's finances. The central bank has
resource constraints than delibcrate political  become the chief borrower ol' about 80 percent
action - and too late to avoid the 1'ina Jal crisis  of thc private banks' lending power.  In this
that brought hyperinflation (approaching 5,00(0)  context, a policy of tight moncy to reduce
percent in 1989). Thc government rani  a primary  aggregate demand basically increases the tratns-
dcf-icit  (not including interest paymentis)  evcry  lers from the public to ihe private sector because
y(  r from  1961 to 1989,  SO  it issued  money  anid  of' the highlCI  deficit that the  rise in interest  rates
inteirest-bearing  debt.  As a result, the cconomy  generates.
expericnced high real interest rates and inflation.
The pressure that government debt puts on
Despite heavy fiscal prcssurc, fiscal spend-  the financial markets is best captured by evaluat-
ing has continued to grow, systematically  ing that debt at the commercial exchange ratc.
exceeding revenues. From 1964 to 1975, the  When the stock of'debt gets out of linie  with
deficit was financed by creating money; witlh  thc  available reserves, pressures mount against the
fall of Peron and the beginning of a military  currcncy and devaluation follows. Then thlc
regime, debt financing became significanit.  remainirng  stock of debt rises at rates Far  bey(,nd
Rodriguez' regression study shows that every I  levels consistent with a fixed exchange raltc  --
percent of primary deficit is linanced with 0.7  and a new crisis begins to develop.
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Argentina has had a sad economic history in recent
decades. As of  '89  real per-capita GDP stays at a level similar
to that of the _arly 1960's.  This means a quarter of a century
without growth at a time when the rest of the world has seen one
of the most glowing periods in terms of economic achievements.
Per-capita GDP reached a historical level in 1974 and has never
again been able to surpass this level in spite of reaching it
again in 1977 and 1979. Since 1980 GDP per capita starts a steep
decline that results in an accumulated fall of 23.5% in the ten
year period 1979-88. During the same decade, the orice level
increased by a factor of 3.36 million, equivalent to an annual
compound rate of inflation  of 349%.
It is not our objective to explain the reasons for the
economic stagnation of  Argentina but to concentrate  on the role
that public sector behavior may have had in that process. In
particular, we shall be concerned with the role of government
spending, taxation and deficit financing on the rest of the
economy. We shall not be concerned with the effects of government
reaulation, a topic that deserves a volume on itself.
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1969  1965  1978  1975  1989  9985Government ha' a very important role in Argentine society.
It taxes, spen'Ts,  produces a wide \,ariety  of goods and services,
regulates financial markets and supplies financial services,
systematically resorts to incomes policies anid  regulates foreign
trade. While the regulatory aspects of government action defy any
possible quantitative measure, we can get a feeling about the
size of government in economic activity by looking at the
relative participation of government spending in GDP. Figure 2
shows thaL government spending has systematically tended to grow
faste- than GDP until the final crisis of the Argentine eccnomy
started to develop in 1982. Since then it has started to fall,
more as a consequence of a resource constraint than as a
consequence of a deliberate political action.
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The fall in the relative size of government spending,
however, came too late to avoid a crisis that was already well
into the working and that brought the country into a state of
hyperinflation in 1989, when the inflation rate approached 50OOO
and GDP fell by about 7%. The inflation rate in Argentina defies
being graphed because of the significant  changes in levels
reached in the late 1980's. The December to December values of
the rate of inflation in the CPI are as shown in Table la, It is
clear that inflation has been an ever present phenomenon in
recent decades and that it has followed an exploding path, of
which the rucent hyperinflation of 1989  does not necessarily
2appear to be the end of the story. In fact, after the peak of
195% monthly inflation rate in July 1989, inflation goes back to
the one-digit monthly level until December 1989. Then a new
hyperinflation starts, which reaches a peak of 95% in March 1990
and apparently ends in April 1990 with a monthly rate ot "only"
11.5%. The monthly inflation rates since 1982 can be seen in
Table lb.
If one were to give a quick characterization  of government
action in Argentina it would be that government has
systematically tended to increase spending and to run deficits.
It is well known that governments do not need to run fiscal
surpluses all of the time, and much less in the context of a
growing economy. The fact of the matter is, however, that the
Argentine economy has been stagnant in the last two decades and
the government has run fiscal deficits for every year at least
since 1961. In fact, the government has run a primary deficit
(not including any interest payments) for every year in  our
sample dating back to 1961. This means that for every year of the
last 28 years, after paying for the current and capital spending
the government has not had any genuine resource left to service
any interest  on its debt (internal or external; this issue has
been raised by Dornbusch and de Pablo (1987)  and by
Rodriguez(1989) in the context of explaining the fiscal nature of
the country's apparent inability to serve her foreign debt that
is mostly public). In  onsequence the government has resorted
systematically to issu-ing  money and interest  earning debt. This
deficit policy resulted in a systematic tendency of the economy
to run high inflation and high real interest rates as a
consequence of the pressure in the credit markets of the
incremental  government borrowing.
For an economy that does not grow and faces a positive
real rate of interest, running a positive primary deficit implies
an ever growing stock of Public debt in relation to GDP. Of
course, in an  ex-post sense real government debt did not grow
continuously because every once in a while the existing stock of
debt has been melted down by outbursts of inflation in excess of
nominal interest rates fueled by large devaluations in the face
of foreign exchange crisis (on the relation  between deficits and
devaluations, captured by increases in the level or in the rate
of change of the exchange rate, see Calvo(1981), Fernandez (1989)
and Rodriguez(1978))
3TABLF  la: ANNUAL  INFLATION  RATES  IN CPI  (1961-1989)
16,5  30J  9  23I
30,2  30,0  2?,3  9,b  6,6
21,7  X1  612  4308 III
335, M716  160A 169,8 1N7
8716  131'3 ,1  13317  61,8
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TABLE  IB: MONTHLY  INFLATION  RATES  IN CPI  (JAN.1982-APRIL  1990)
11.9  5;3  4.7  4.2  3.1  7.9
*W:XStti  16.3  14.7  17.1  12.7  11.3  18.6
'1B^StI  16.9  13.0  11.3  10.3  9.1  15.9
1WlXl  12.5  17,2  21.4  17.08  19.2  17.7
12.5  1?.0  20.3  18.5  ?.1  17.9
1B  18.3  22.8  27.5  19.3  15.0  19.7
25.1  20.7  26.5  29.5  25.1  36.5
1  6.2  3.1  2.8  1.9  2.4  3.2
3.8  1.7  4.6  I.7  4.0  4.5
SI'IsU]  6.8  8.8  7.2  6.1  5.3  4.7
7.6  6.5  8.2  3.4  4.2  8.8
1l¢ssl  18.1  13.7  11.7  19.5  10.3  3.4
9.1  10.4  14.?  17.2  15.7  18.8
*  25.6  27.6  11.7  9.9  5.7  6.0
Uim  8.9  9,6  17.9  33.4  78.5  114.5
*¢Rsr  19b.6  37.9  9.4  5.6  6.5  49.1
79.Z  61.6  95.0  11.6
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The tendency to melt down the existing stock of debt by
means of  implementing unexpected devaluations was eventually
discounted by the market and in recent years the market has
demanded, and obtained, an increasing degree of indexation of the
public debt by either the price level or the price of foreign
exchange. As this happened, the government could not melt down
any longer the stock of real debt and had to facc -- he critical
problem of a growing real debt in the face of a p.sistent
tendency to run primary deficits.
The primary deficit starts falling since 1983 as a result
of reduced spending and higher revenues. This late effort,
however, is not enough to reverse the increasing reluctance of
the public to hold the internal government debt as well as the
domestic currency. The government must resort increasingly  to the
use of .orced investments  of the banking system (depositos
indisponibles). The fall in demand for domestic-currency
denominated assets induces real interest rates that are
inconsistent with the real equilibrium of the economy. The shift
out of the domestic currency results in an increasing degree of
dollarization of the economy and a tendency for recurrent
currency runs that result in frequent macro devaluations.  At this
5point the gover-nment  is forced to continuously raise interest
rates in order to induce the public to keep holding the domestic
currency and to roll-over the public debt.
The higher interest rates are paid back issuing more debt
and money, and the service of the debt becomes the major source
of money creation. The system finally explodes when the country
enters intc hyperinflation in May 1989. The hyperinflation
however, was not able to melt down the stock of interest-earning
debt of the government, as much of it was placed with a maturity
of between 1 and 7 days and interest rates actually had a
tendency to anticiDate devaluations. In January 1990 the
government mandatorily canceled all interest  earning obligations
in thie  financial system  (government  debt plus all interest-
earning deposits) with an issue of dollar-denominated government
paper  paying LIBO rate and with a 10 year maturity. It remains
to he seen whether the needed fiscal adjustment is actually
implemented  and turns out to be enough to induce the public to
keep holding what was left remaining of the money aupply
denominated in local currency.
This paper is concerned with the effects of public sector
deficits and the ways of financing on several variables of the
economy: inflation, interest rates, the real exchange rate,
private savings and investments and external balance.  Section II
deal with the issue df-the measurement of the deficit,
distinguishing between-the conventional deficit of the
Consolidated non-financial public sector (II.1) and the
quasifiscal deficit originating  ,n  the financial operations of
the monetary authorities( II.2).  Section III  looks at the use of
monetary vs. debt financing and provides a measure of the
inflation tax(III.1) as well as some statistical  estimates of the
effects on inflation of deficit financing(III.2). Section IV
briefly describes the structure of financial markets with
emphasis on the menu of debt instruments  of the government that
form the internal public debt. This section is also concerned
about the peculiar role that public debt plays in a financial
system where the Central Bank has practically become the borrower
of about 80% of all the lending power of the private banks. In
this context, a policy of tight money to reduce aggregate demand
basically increases the transfers from the public to the private
sector on account of the higher deficit that the raise in
interest rates generates.
6Section V p-ovides estimates of demand for money and of the
relation between the revenue from inflation and the inflation
rate.  The issue of interest rate determination in the context of
a market where the government is practically the only debtor is
dealt in Section VI. In the short run (VI.1), interest rates are
determined by the amount of liquidity the Central Bank is willing
to provide to the system ( basically captured by the relation
betwe3n remunerated and non-remunerated bank deposits). Estimates
of the interest elasticity of demand for deposits and pub .c  debt
are provided in VI.2.  The long run inflation rate (VI.3) is
determined by the rate of monetary expa-;sionl  required to finance
the deficit, including the service on the real interest on the
public debt. Short run sterilization of liquidity by issuing  more
debt reduces inflation for a while but event-ally as the interest
has to be served, the rate of monetary expansion is raised and
the net effect of the sterilization policy is more long run
inflation because of the now higher quasifiscal deficit.
Section VII deals with the external effects of the public
sector deficits and the composition of government spending.The
Real Exchange rate determination is dealt in the context of a
theoretical model (VII.1)  that is later estimated empirically
(VII.2).  Theoretical aspects of the process of determination of
the Trade Balance are presented in VII.3  and the empirical
estimates are shown in VII.4.  The empirical estimates do adjust
to what is expected f?om the theoretical analysis except in the
case of the effects of-external indebtedness  on the external
balance: basically the empirical results indicate that the
economy has not adjusted to the need to service the higher level
of debt by reducing the level of expenditure relative to income.
Section VIII  presents a  general summary and the main conclusions
of the study.
Finally,  the Appendix studies in detail the long run
empirical relation between the fiscal deficit and the rates of
private sector savings and investment.
7II. MEASUREMENT OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT IN ARGENTINA
In the last 15 years many important.  changes occurred in
the distribution of revenues and expsnditures among different
levels of government in Argentina. These changes were due to: i)
the transfer of important expenditure items, like education
(elementary and secondary) and local transport systems (like the
Buenos Aires metro), from the central to the provincial and city
governments; and ii) changes in the tax laws and the rules under
which tax revenues are distributed among the central and the
provincial governments (the Federal Coparticipation Law).
Provincial and local governments have no well-defined budget
constraints in Argentina, and the distributicn  of resources
(which are collected mainly by the central governmen  is subject
to a highly unpredictable pattern. This makes very importait, in
the Argentine case, to work on the basis of the consolidated non-
financial public sector data. Among the studies dealing with the
behavior of the consolidated non-financial public sector in
Argentina we may mention the stuay by FIEL(198-1)  and also
Schenone(1987).
In the Argentine case it is also very important  to account
for the operations of the Central Bank as sources of substantial
amounts of revenue (due to inflationary  money creation) and no
less substantial losses, due to: i, the purchase of international
reserves (including those required to service the foreign debt),
ii) the offering of swiaps  and other "exchange insurance"
mechanisms, which have been frequently used to attract short term
foreign financing, and iii) losing  operations with the domestic
financial system (including the bailout of failing financial
institutions). In subsection II.2 below we present estimates made
by F.I.E.L. of  tosses  made by the Central Bank of Argentina,
which should be considered as components of public sector
expenditures.
II.1  Consolidated Non-Financial Public Sector
This subsection presents the official data on the
consolidated non-financial public sector ("above the line")
expenditure, revenue, and financing needs (deficit), according to
the so called "international  methodology," as well as the "below
the line" financiig flows. The international  methodology does not
consider the current revenue and expenditure of public
enterprises as components of the publir sector's  revenue and
expenditure; it only computes as such t,geir  operating surplusas
or deficits.
8Table  2 presents  the following  above  the  line'  items:
A.  Current  Revenue
B.  Current  Expenditure
C.  Capital  Revenue
D.  Capital  Expenditure
E.  Total  Revenue  (including  remanent  of prev.  Fiscal  Years
and contributions)
F.  Total  Exuenditure  (incl.  contributions)
G.  Deficit  or  Financing  Needs  (F-E)
TABLE  2. Consolidated  Nonfinancial  Public  Sector  "Above  the Line"
Data  (%GDP)
Item  A.  B.  C.  D.  E.  F.  G.
Year
1961  23.17  17.41  0.55  10.68  28.67  33.03  4.36
62  18.63  17.84  0.76  9.32  23.85  31.61  7.76
63  18.47  17.93  0.68  8.22  23.37  30.37  7
64  13.00  18.11  0.37  6.89  22.81  29.43  6.62
65  18.86  16.88  0.35  6.41  22.31  26.39  4.08
66  20.13  18.98  0.36  6.45  24.52  29.45  4.93
67  23.35  18.26  0.48  7.65  27.78  29.86  2.08
68  22.8  17.24  0.E4  1.33  27.58  29.81  2.23
89  22.5.3  16.53  0.45  8.21  26.67  28.42  1.75
70  22.843  16.65  0.43  8.48  26.68  28.55  1.87
71  20.51  17.04  0.34  8.2  24.72  29.12  4.4
72  18.35  15.66  0.32  8.81  23  28.&  5.8
73  19.01  19.11  0.11  1.5  25.07  32.55  7.48
74  22.12  21.8'  0.49  8.81  30.09  38.17  8.08
75  15.87  22.16  0.15  8.94  27.1  42.18  15.08
76  18.14  18.92  0.15  13.96  27.78  39.47  11.69
77  22.93  14.78  0.4  13.26  28.85  33.56  4.71
'8  25.44  19.75  0.35  12.54  31.29  37.79  6.5
79  24.44  21.1  0.25  10.51  31.84  38.35  6.51
80  26.89  25.75  0.31  9.51  33.75  41.22  ;.47
81  24.39  29.11  0.25  9.65  32.95  A6.21  13.26
82  22.53  29.9  0.49  8.56  30.51  45.63  15.12
83  23.08  29.03  0.23  9.68  40.24  55.39  15.15
84  22.49  27.03  0.24  7.82  33.65  45.57  11.92
85  26.96  26.9  0.25  7.06  40.92  46.94  6.02
86  26.17  24.54  0.21  7.48  40.1  44.8?  4.73
87  23.33  23.23  0.25  6.13  34.59  40.13  5.54
88  na  na  na  na  na  na  7.39*
*:For  1988 the  data  available  does not  include the deficit  of
Provinces  and  the city of Bs.As..For  the  rest of  the CPS the
deficit  is 6.93%  of GDP. We estimate  a deficit  of Provinces  and
Bs.As.  equal  to the one  in 1987 that was 0.46%  of GOP.FIGURE 4
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Figure 4 shows'the evolution of total expenditures and
revenues (as percentage of GDP) of the Consolidated Non-Financial
Public Sector (CPS). The first thing to notice is that Revenues
have historically shown a growing trend similar to that of
Expenditures while beir.g  systematically below them. Total
Revenues rose from a low level of about 23% in 1962/65 to a high
of  41% in 1985. It should be mentioned that the Revenue measure
does not incorporate  the Current Revenues from Public
Enterprises. This high growth in fiscal revenues in the face of a
stagnant economy should be enough to invalidate  the commonly held
claim that the basic problem in Argentina is that the public does
not pay taxes.  The fe:t of the matter is that not only is fiscal
pressure very high bu.t  it has grown at a much faster rate than
that of GDP in the last 25 years.
It is the case that even though fiscal pressure has been
high, fiscal spending has also grown and has systematically
exceeded revenues. Expenditures of the CPS got to a level of 55%
of GDP in 1983 (up from  a level of 30% in the decadesof the
1960s) before a serious attempt was started to reduce government
spending.  Since then government spending was reduced by 11% of
GDP but this reduction was wiped out by the increased  quasifiscal
spending done by the Central Bank in order to service the
accumulated level of financial liabilities  of the institution.
10The Financing Needs column (Column  G in Table 2)
represents the difference between globally defined Expenditures
and Resources. As such it has to be financed through increases in
short and long run debt (domestic or foreign), advances from
suppliers or, finally, money creation in the form of credit from
the Central Bank and increases in short term financial
liabilities.
Table 3 presents the "below  the line" items that describe
the composition of the financing of the fiscal deficit.
It can be seen that in every year since 1961 up to 1988
the Financial Result has been negative, meaning that there has
always been the need to resort to printing money or issuing  short
term financial liabilities in order to balance the budget.
According to the official data there has been no financing of the
CPS from the Central Bank since 1986 onwards. Up to mid-1985
Central Bank financing to the CPS was recorded in an account
labeled Advances to the Treasury. Since the stabilization attempt
launched in June 1985, no more drawings were made to that account
and this is what the official statistics reflect.  The fact of the
matter, how.ver, is that since then the CPS has borrowed from the
Central Bank by obtaining Rediscounts for Public Banks and other
Public Enterprises, thbt have not been paid back. It has also
resorted to placing dollar denominated Treasury Bills at the
Central Bank in exchange for local currency, an operation that
has been labeled as external financing but that is actually fully
equivalent to printing money, particularly because these dollar
denominated Treasury Bills will very likely  never be paid back.
The Central Bank-  also has become the recipient  of a large
fraction of the service of the foreign debt.
1  1TABLE  3.  Consolidated  Nonfinancial  Public  Sector  "Below  the  Line"
Data  (%GDP)
Item  A  B  B1  Bla  Bib  Blc  C  C1  C2
Year\
61  4.36  2.86  2.86  2.38  0.48  0  -1.5  0.19  1.32
62  7.76  4.52  4.52  3.77  0.75  0  -3.24  0.71  2.53
63  7  3.15  3.15  2.26  0.89  0  -3.85  1.37  2.49
64  6.62  1.09  1.09  0.71  0.38  0  -5.53  0.49  5.04
65  4.08  1.2  1.2  0.5  0.7  0  -2.88  0.83  2.04
66  4.93  0.31  0.31  0.01  0.3  0  -4.62  0.28  4.35
67  2.08  -0.17  -0.17  0.12  -0.29  0  -2.25  1  1.26
68  2.23  0.42  0.42  0.47  -0.05  0  -1.81  0.71  1.1
69  1.75  0.94  0.94  0.57  0.37  0  -0.81  0.72  0.1
70  1.87  0.86  0.86  0.05  0.81  0  -1.01  3.38  -2.36
71  4.4  1.92  1.92  0.73  1.19  0  -2.48  2.43  0.06
72  5.8  1.93  1.93  0.89  1.04  0  -3.87  1.81  2.06
73  7.48  0.91  0.91  0.79  0.12  0  -6.57  4.47  2.1
74  8.08  1.87  1.87  1  0.87  0  -6.21  5.6  0.62
75  15.08  1.88  1.88  1.77  0.11  0  -13.2  9.74  3.46
76  11.69  4.14  0.14  3.03  1.11  0  -7.55  3.41  4.13
77  4.71  2.83  2.83  1.54  1.29  0  -1.88  2.44  -0.56
78  6.5  5.49  5.49  3.54  1.95  0  -1.01  0.86  0.16
79  6.51  5.53  5.53  3.77  1.76  0  -0.98  -0.3  1.27
80  7.47  2.99  3.4.  1.53  1.88  -0.42  -4.48  3.59  0.89
81  13.26  8.03  8.27-  3.97  4.3  -0.24  -5.23  5.32  -0.09
82  15.12  6.3  6.39  5.07  1.32  -0.09  -8.82  7.29  1.51
83  15.15  -1.63  -1.34  -1.89  0.55  -0.29  -16.78  16.6  0.19
84  11.92  -1.49  -1.48  -0.59  -0.89  -0.01  -13.41  6.19  7.22
85  6.02  0.58  0.63  -0.3  0.93  -0.05  -5.44  2.33  3.11
86  4.73  -0.02  0.04  -1.01  1.05  -0.06  -4.75  0  4.74
87  5.54  4.17  4.22  1.03  3.19  -0.05  -1.37  0  1.37
88  7.39
A.  Deficit  or  Financing  Needs
B.  Net  Financing
B1.  Net  use  of  credit
Bla.  Net  use  of  domestic  credit
Bib.  Net  use  of  foreigh  credit
Blc.  Net  Use  of  Advances  from  Suppliers
C.  Result  (B minus  A)
Cl.  Central  Bank
C2.  Increase  of  Net  Financial  Liabilities
121I.2  Cuasifiscal Expenditures
In countries like Argentina, the Central Bank often
suffers substantial losses due to loans to the private financial
system which can never be recovered, or to the bailout of failing
financial institutions.  The Central Bank started in 1977 to
collect  interest on the fraction of Reserve Requirements that
corresponded to non-remunerated bank deposits (Demand Deposits)
and to pay interest on the reserve requirements  made on account
of interest-earning Time Deposits. The balance of these
operations is denominated the Monetary Regulation Account, that
has proven to be a source of additional deficit as the interest
paid has exceeded the interest collected. In 1985 the Monetary
Regulation  Account was modified by a system that incorporated
remunerated and non-remunerated reserve requirements;  in
addition, the Central Bank started to sterilize liquid funds by
issuing a variety of short term liabilities  that included  short
term CD's and  lump-sum mandator) deposits that absorbed part of
the Commercial Banks liquidity.
The Central Bank is also subject to losses derived from
swaps and different "exchange insurance"  mechanisms, which are
frequently used to attract short term foreign financing. Finally,
the accumulation of international reserves is an important item
of public capital expenditure, which obviously does not show up
anywhere in the consolidated non-financial public sector
accounting.
Table 4 below presents estimates by F.I.E.L. of the
cuasifiscal expenditures of the Central Bank of Argentina in the
period 1960-85.
It is difficult to determine ex-ante when the Quasi-Fiscal
deficit w.ill  result in additional money creation as much of the
interest on the Central Bank's Liabilities  has been paid with the
creation of more of those liabilities.  This mechanism gave raise
to a situation in which gradually the Central Bank started to
absorb a growing fraction of the lending capability of Commercial
Banks. As of 1989, it is reported that above 80% of the Assets of
the Commercial Banks were placed in liabilities  of the Central
Bank. Instead of being the "Lender  of Last Resort", this
mechanism of liabilities management  generated a situation in
which the Central Bank become the "Borrower of First R9gsort".  The
implications  of this mechanism for monetary policy and the
eventual development of a hyperinflation will be discussed later
in the Section dealing with monetary policy.
13TABLE  4. Cuasifiscal  Expenditures  of the Central  Bank  (% GDP)
Year\Item  A  B  C  D  Total
60  -0.32  2.09  1.77
61  1.82  -2.26  -0.44
62  0.34  -3.08  -2.74
63  -0.85  0.92  0.07
64  -0.52  -0.81  -1.33
65  0.11  0.28  0.39
66  -0.39  -0.16  -0.55
67  -1.24  2.66  1.42
68  -0.03  -0.14  -0.17
69  0.94  -1.33  -0.39
70  -0.54  0.48  -0.06
71  0.66  -1.75  -1.09
72  -0.51  0.69  0.18
73  -1.83  0.77  -1.06
74  -2.79  -1.14  -3.93
75  -2.27  0.16  -1.3  -3.41
76  -6.21  5  3.46  2.25
77  -5.86  1.28  0.57  3.59  -0.42
78  -2.36  2.72  1.98  2.34
79  -0.82  0.86  2.8  2.83
80  3.17  -0.61  -3.43  -0.87
81  2.94  -1.38  3.99  -5.33  0.22
82  7.0?  4.96  16.63  -3.74  25.45
83  -3.69  1.04  8.59  -1.06  4.87
84  3.8  4.06  10.01  -0.3  17.56
85  -1.78  1.56  4.63  2.99  7.0
A.  Annual  changes  in loans  to the  financial  system  minus
annual  changes  in reserve  requirements.
B. The  Interest  Equalization  Account  (Cuenta de Regulaci6n
Monetaria)  introduced  in 1977 and  the cost of remunerated
reserve  requirements  and other  remunerated
liabilities  introduced  in its place  in 1985.
C. Losses  for Swaps  and other  "exchange  insurance"
mechanisms.
D. Accumulation  of International  Reserves.
Source:  FIEL  (1986)  "El Gasto  Publico  en la Argentina  1960-1985."
14Table 5 summarizes the results concerning the fiscal
deficit, showing the Primary Deficit of the Consolidated Non-
Financial Public Sector (net of interest payments), and the
Quasi-Fiscal Deficit of the Central Bank.
Another important source of Quasi-Fiscal deficit were the
losses from Swaps  and other exchange rate insurance  mechanisms.
These operations were concentrated in the 1982-85 period and
resulted in the Central Bank absorbing most of the outstanding
external debt of the private sector (this process is described in
detail in Rodriguez(1989)).  The FIEL figures reported in Column
C of Table 3, corresponding to this period, overestimate the
Quasi-fiscal expenditure impact  of these policies, because the
exchange losses they implied  were not presently realized but
simply documented as public external debt. In addition, these
figures include interest  accrued, although not actually paid, on
that debt. To the extent that the external debt was not fully
serviced, this new liability did not result in money creation.
Some took place, however, through the implementation  of a variety
of debt conversion mechanisms, including  debt-equity swaps and
onlending, that in effect implied the repurchase of external debt
with newly printed money or  short term financial liabilities
issued in local currency.
15TABLE  5 Summary  Results  on Fiscal  Deficit
Year  Interest  Primary  Total  CPS Quasi  Fiscal  TOTAL
CPS  Deficit  CPS  Deficit  Deficit  DEFICIT
61  0.67  3.69  4.36  -0.44  3.92
62  0.83  6.93  7.76  -2.74  5.02
63  0.88  6.12  7  0.07  7.07
64  1.11  5.51  6.62  -1.33  5.29
65  0.75  3.33  4.08  0.39  4.47
66  0.75  4.18  4.93  -0.55  4.38
67  0.59  1.49  2.08  1.42  3.5
68  0.53  1.7  2.23  -0.17  2.06
69  0.39  1.36  1.75  -0.39  1.36
70  0.41  1.46  1.87  -0.06  1.81
71  0.48  3.92  4.4  -1.09  3.31
72  0.57  5.23  5.8  0.18  5.98
73  0.53  6.95  7.48  -1.06  6.42
74  0.81  7.27  8.08  -3.93  4.15
75  0.69  14.39  15.08  -3.41  11.67
76  1.47  10.22  11.69  2.25  13.94
77  1.14  3.57  4.71  -0.42  4.29
78  1.92  4.58  6.50  2.34  8.84
79  2.03  4.48  6.51  2.83  9.34
80  1.85  5.62  7.47  -0.87  6.6
81  3.88  9.38  13.26  0.22  13.48
82  6.28  8.84  15.12  25.45  40.57
83  3.5  11.65  15.15  4.87  20.02
84  2.93  8.99  11.92  17.56  29.48
85  2.93  3.09  6.02  7.40  13.42
86  2.37  2.36  4.73  N.A.  N.A.
87  1.88  3.66  5.54  N.A.  N.A.
88  2.09  5.30  7.39  N.A.  N.A.
16III. THE INFLATIONARY FINANCING OF THE DEFICIT
III.1  Measuring the Inflation Tax
In the previous section we have presented data regarding
alternative measures of the fiscal deficit. As it was already
mentioned before, we have doubts about the relevance of the data
presented in Table 3  showing the official information regarding
the actual financing of the deficit. In particular that
information indicates that there is no Central Bank financing to
the Consolidated Non-Financial Public Sector during the years
1986-87.  We do know there were several ways through which direct
Treasury borrowing from the Central Bank was diverted in such a
way that it did not show openly in the accounts. The granting of
Rediscounts to Public Enterprises or placing Treasury paper
denominated in dollars were some of the ways used to avoid direct
borrowing in Australes by the Treasury from the Central Bank.
Public construction programs were implemented  by the Banco
Hipotecario (the state mortgage bank) and fully financed through
Central Bank rediscounts that were never returned. Banco
Hipotecario is alleged to have lost about one billion dollars in
1987-88 because of these operations and all of this was financed
with money creation.
Because of the above questions we have resorted to measure
the fraction of  the defticit  that was financed with printing of
money directly from the accounts of the monetary sector.
We measured the revenue from money creation as the
absolute monthly change in Ml (non-interest  bearing money)
divided by the exchange rate for the dollar in the free market.
This provide us with a monthly series of dollar revenue from
money creation. We then added up those series over each year to
get the annual revenues. Finally we divided nominal GDP of each
year by the average exchange rate in the free market to get the
estimate of dollar GDP. Dividing both series we get the revenue
from money creation as a percentage of GDP.
The series constructed above has one serious problem that
makes it not comparable with our series of the CPS deficit. Since
the Central Bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market by
buying or selling foreign exchange, in  many instances the changes
in Ml are due to increases in money demand that are provided
through purchases of international reserves. Conversely, when the
reserves are lost, we observe a significant fall in the revenue
from money creation as measured. Sinc#e  Reserve purchase's  or sales
are not considered a public expenditure in the accounts of the
CPS, we have resorted to subtracting those reserve changes from
our series of revenue from inflation.
17Figure 5
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With the correction described above the series of the
revenue from money creation obtained from the monetary data shows
a clear correlation with the series of the deficit of the CPS
obtained from the fiscal data. Both series are shown in Figure 5.
Almost systematically, the Deficit of the Consolidated Public
Sector (DEFT from column 5 in Table 4) exceeds the Revenue from
Money Creation. The difference between both series can be taken
as an approximation to the part of the total deficit that was
financed through the issuing of interest earning debt. The
generation cf public debt should have been larger than this
amount on the account that the Central Bank had its own
quasifiscal deficit that also had to be financed. While we have
the FIEL data -in  Table 4, we do not feel it is  comparable with
our series because that part of what FIEL calls quasifiscal
expenditures may actually be indirect financing of the CPS
deficit through the variety of mechanisms that were previously
discussed. The FIEL data also considers the changes of Reserves
as part of the quasifiscal expenditures.
18With the above caveats, the data in Figure 5 describes
quite closely the events insofar as the actual ways of deficit
financing that took place over recent years. It can be seen that
from 1964 through 1975 the deficit of the CPS did not exceed
significantly the revenue from money creation. This means that
the fiscal deficit was mainly financed through monatary creation
rather than issuing debt. The situation changes drastically from
1976 onwards when debt financing apparently becomes a  significant
part of the total. This change coincides with the fall of the
Peronist Government and the initiation of the military regime. In
1977 there was a significant financial liberalization  that opened
the domestic financial market to foreign investors. The period
1977-79  is signed by foreign borrowing and the revenue from
money creation falls well below historical levels.  The banking
crisis of early 1980 set the end to this stage of foreign
financing of the deficit and opens the way for the next stage of
internal  debt financing that lasts up to 1985. From 1985 onwards
starts a serious effort of reduction of the total deficit of the
CPS. The use of the inflation tax, however, does not fall
proportionately to the deficit of the CPS because of the
increasing financing pressures of the service of the internal
debt concentrated mostly in the Central Bank.
Figure 6
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19I1I.2  The Fiscal  Deficit  and The  Inflation  Tax:  Statistical
Evidence
In the previous section we saw that the revenue from money
creation appears to be closely associated to the deficit of the
Consolidated Public Sector. This should not surprise us since the
printing of money is one of the only two ways to finance the
deficit of the CPS, the other being issuing  new interest  earning
debt. Irn  this section we will try to identify  more closely the
nature of this relationship using regression analysis.
Our methodology consists in considering the revenue from
money creation as an endogenous variable that is  explained, among
other things by the CPS need to finance its deficit. We therefore
consider the deficit of the CPS as the exogenous variable that
gives raise to the need of resorting to the inflation tax.
Because of the possibility of financing the deficit with internal
or external debt one should not expect a one-to-one stable
relation between the inflation tax and the deficit. In fact, as
our discussion above indicates, there were periods in which it
was apparent that debt financing was much more used than in
others. Nevertheless, one should consider that debt generation in
excess of real growth will eventually have to be canceled or
financed through inflation as the market for placing new debt
eventually dries out
Since it was also obvioub from the inspection of the data
that a change in the financing modality took place from 1976
onwards (towards using more debt financing), we have included a
dummy (D76 equal zero up to 1975 and one afterwards). Regression
III.1  reports the results concerning the relation between the
inflation tax (ITAX) and the total deficit of the Consolidated
Non-Financial Public Sector(DEFT).
REGRESSION III.1
ITAX  1.248  - 2.138  )76 +  0.564  DEFT




The regression was also tried with correction for first order
autocorrelation of residuals but the AR(1) coefficient  did not
turn out as significant.
20The coefficient of the DEFT variable is 0.56 meaning that
56% of the CPS fiscal deficit tends to be financed through money
creation.  The coefficient of DEFT on ITAX is highly significant
and justifies the presumption that deficit financing is a
significant factor explaining the need for the inflation tax. The
negative coefficient on the D76 variable indicates that since
that year there has been a tendency to use less inflationary
financing for any amount of DEFT and in consequence that there
has been a shift towards more debt financing.
We have also tried to use the Primary Deficit of the CPS
(PD, not including any interest service) as the explanatory
variable for ITAX and found the surprising result that it works
much better than the total deficit (DEFT). The results are
reported in Regression III.2.
REGRESSION  III.2
ITAX  0.936  - 1.21 D76  +  0.70  PD
(1.5)  (-1.98)  (7.47)




The results of Regressions III.1  and III.2  suggest the
possibility of a tendency to finance the Primary deficit with
money and to roll over the interest  expenditures in the form of
new debt. In order to check for that possibility  we have included
the interest expenditure of the CPS as an additional explanatory
variable, together with the Primary Deficit. If all deficits,
independently from its source received the same treatment we
should expect the coefficient on the interest  expenses (IE)  to be
the same as the coefficient on the Primary Dnficit. This does not
turn out to be the case, as the results of Regression 3 show.  As
shown, the Primary Deficit retains the same coefficient of 0.7
while the interest expenditures turns out to be insignificant in
explaining the inflation tax. We conclude that over the sample
period authorities have used the inflation  tax to finance primary
expenditures while interest expenditures that result from the
existing stock of Government Debt have tended to be refinanced
through the issue of more debt.
21REGRESSION  III.3
ITAX  0.929  - 1.26 D76  +  0.697 PD +  0.027  IE
(1.4)  (-1.4)  (6.78)  (0.08)




In order to determine the effects of the Public Sector
deficit on inflation tne next natural step is to ascertain the
relation between the inflation rate and the revenue from money
creation. Such link is provided by the demand for real cash
balances that has the inflation rate as one of its determining
variables (taken as a measure of the opportunity cost of holding
money). Precise estimates of money demand for Argentina will be
derived in the next section but we can already derive some
preliminary estimates by running a regression of the inflation
rate on the series of revenue from money creation.
The response of the inflation rate to the printing of
money in order to finance the deficit need not be instantaneous
as there may be lags  En the adjustment of prices to changes in
the money supply. We therefore include inflation lagged  one year
as an explanatory variable for current inflation in addition of
current revenue from money creation. The results are presented in
Regression 4  that indicates a clear association between the
revenue from money creation and the resulting inflation rate.
Here we have assumed a linear relation between ITAX and the
inflation rate, a fact that may not be valid for high inflation
rates because as inflation raises the base of the tax, real cash
balances falls and actual revenue  may actually fall. In the next
section we derive the precise non-linear relationship using an
estimate of the demand for money. Cur results here are therefore
an approximation valid for inflation rates to the left of the
maximum of the revenue curve.
The results of Regression III.4  indicate that the long run
effect of raising 1% point of GOP from money creation is
associated with an additional 97% inflation rate.
22Regressions 2 and 4 provide a structural framework for the
relation between the Public Sector Deficit and inflation. A 1%
point of Primary Deficit is financed with 0.7% of revenue from
money creation (the rest with debt), and the effect of collecting
this revenue from money creation is around 67.9% of additional
inflation( 97*0.7).
REGRESSION III.4
INF =  -84.98  +  0.151  INF(-1)  +  29.34  ITAX




IMPLIED LONG RUN RELATION:
INF - -340  +  97.2 PD
23IV.  INFLATION,  THE REVENUE  FROM MONEY  CREATION  AND  THE STRUCTURE
OF  FINANCIAL  MARKETS
As it  could be expected ini  an economy subject to frequent
shocks as Argentina, the financial markets are highly volatile
and cannot be easily described by a simple set of instruments.
The financial reform of 1977 freed interest rates and allowed
banks to capture interest earning deposits called "Plazos
Fijos"\l/.  Previous to the 1977 reform, interest rates were set
by the Central Bank and credit was normally rationed as the
interest rates tended to be negative in real terms.
The financial wealth of Argentines can tentatively be
divided between five main groups of assets:
1- Currency plu2 demand deposits, or the aggregate M1.
2- Time Deposits (Plazos Fijos) denominated in local currency.
3- Dollar denominated bonds of the Government called BONEX.
4- Foreign financial assets, mostly denominated in U.S.currency.
5- A whole variety of local-currency-denominated  Government paper
including at times Trbasury Bills and Central Bank CD's.
\1/ The financial liberalization  was but one of the many policy
instruments  of what came to be known as the Stabilization Plar of
December 1978. The plan started being instrumented  after the
military coup of March 1976; the financi..l  opening of 1977 was
followed by the Tabla Cambiaria (prefixed  exchange rate path) and
the trade reform of 1978. The Plan was abandoned after March 1981
in the middle of a set of serious disadjustments, among them
currency overvaluation, persistence of inflation and the external
debt problem. The lack of fiscal adjustment has been blamed as
the main reason for the failure of this stabilization attempt
that aimed at making structural adjustment the centerpiece of the
policies being followed. Literature covering developments durir.g
this period include Calvo(1981,1987), de Pablo(1983),
Rodriguez(1982,1983), Fernandez(1982), Fernandez and
Rodriguez(1982) and Sjaastad(1982). The sequential order of
financial and trade liberalization  has also been mentioned as a
factor contributing to the failure of the plan, an issue that is
analyzed in Edwards(1984).
24The above list roughly describes the alternatives open to
the public since the reform of 1977. Unfortunately we do not have
reliable data describing assets holdings prior to that reform.
Loosely speaking, however, we can say that the Argentine economy
has experienced a sustained process of demonetization
(dollarization?) in recent decades. The real amount of Ml (non-
interest bearing money) has systematically dEcreased since 1970
as shown in Figure 7 (the apparent real incrtvase  in Ml during
1973-75  was really due to the price freeze imposed during the
period that resulted in the inflationary  explosion known as
"Rodrigazo" in mid-1975). The time path of real M2 (Ml plus time
deposits) has depended more on the evolution of  interest rates
paid on time deposits.
FIGURE  7
REAL  UALUE  OF MI (MONTHLY  1960-89)
175  m 
750  . . . . . . ..  . . . .. t
?5  . ....  .....  . ........
2 5  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  . .
1969  1965  1979  1977  1989  1985  1999
.MIR
25FIGURE  8
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The debt policy'  of the government has much to do with the
performance of the financial portfolio of the private sector, the
reason being that the government has gradually become the
"borrower  of first resort" of the economy and as a consequence
most of the financial assets of the private sector are either
directly or indirectly  the result of loans to the public sector
(except, of course, the holdings of foreign exchange).
Tables 6 and 7 provide estimates of the domestic interest
earning debt of the Treasury and the Central Bank. Practically
all of the Central Bank debt is directly held by commercial banks
under the form of compulsory reserve requirements ("depositos
indisponiDles")  or, at times, under voluntary holdings of Central
Bank's CD's. The commercial banks, in turn, obtain their funds by
raising interest  earning deposits from the public. What we
therefore observe in practice is a system in which most of the
public's deposits at commercial banks are lent to the Central
Bank and used to finance the fiscal  deficit. Part of the deposits
of the public may be lent to the private sector, but that amount
has been gradually displaced in favor of lending to ttle  Central
Bank as it can be appreciated from data in Table 9 from where it
follows that most of the lending  capability generated by the
public's demand for M2 is absorbed in the form of domestic
liabilities  of the Central Bank.
26The pressure put on the financial markets by the
government debt is best captured by evaluating this debt at the
commercial exchange rate. Normally authorities try to stabilize
the economy by fixing the exchange rate at the level given by the
Commercial Rate. As credibility in the plan decreases, interest
rates raise and the stock of government debt tends to raise in
terms of dollars. When the stock of debt, particularly the short
term debt of the central Bank, gets out of line with the
available Reserves, pressures mount against the currency and a
devaluation finally follows. Normally devaluations are
successfull in reducing the dollar value of the government debt
denominated in Australes but not so much in reducing the interest
rates in dollar equivalent paid on the remaining stock. As a
consequence, immediately after the devaluation the remaining
stock of debt continues raising at rates far beyond the level
consistent with a fixed exchange rate and a new crisis starts to
devel  OD.
Table 8 shows the evolution of the total domestic
liabilities of the Central Bank and the total value of M2
(Currency plus Demand and Time deposits). The ratio between both
concepts has oscillated between 50% and 82% depending on the
degree of the absorption by the Central Bank of the credit
availability at the Commercial Banks.
The Primavera Plan started in August 1988 with a stock of
internal debt of 8.6 bitlion dollars and brought it up to 18
billion  dollars  after  8 months,  in March  1989. Since  GDP stands
around 70 billion dollars, it is clear that a rate of debt
accumulation on the part of the Public Sector of 13% of GDP in
only 8 months was unsustainable and a foreign exchange crisis was
called for. The collapse of the Primavera Plan in February
started a series of devaluations that melted down the debt  up to
5.7 billion by July 1989 when the Bunge and Born Plan started
with a big devaluation and the announcement  of a fixed exchange
rate for ever since. In the next four months the level of
domestic debt rose to 7.9 billion dollars (evaluated at the new
exchange rate) mostly on account of the interest  service of the
inherited debt. This time the market was  aware of the final
effects of rapid rates of debt accumulation and did not wait for
debt to reach levels similar to those of the prior stabilization
attempt. A new crisis took place in December that forced the
abandonment of the BB Plan and the conversion of all Time
Deposits (and the Reserve Requirements that backed them) into  a
10 year BONEX on January 1, 1990. As a counterpart of the
conversion of the liabilities  of commercial  banks into Bonex,
all government debt with the banks was also turned into BONEX, as
well as most of the government paper in the hands of the public
(exemptions were cash, demand deposits, time deposits up to about
300 dollars and the already existing stock of BONEX from previous
years).
27TABLE  6  TREASURY  ,' CENTRAL  TOTAL
Date  DEBT  ::BANK  DEBT  DEBT
INTEREST  - ----  *1-----------
EARNING  DEBT  DE85  312  "  3427  3739
OF  THE  PUBLIC  JA86  315  H  3383  :  3698
SECTOR  FE86  316  H  3829  4145
(Millions  of  MA86  307  H  4293  4600
Australes)  I  AP86  313  H  4079  4392
INCLUDES  ONLY  MY86  302  4782  5084
INTERNAL  DEBT  JN86  300  5039  5339
JL86  308  5316  5624
AG86  319  H  5765  6084
SE86  322  H  6250  6572
OC86  334  H  5616  5950
N086  330  H  6742  7072
DE86  1297  7  7072  8369
JA87  1666  ::  7505  9171
FE87  1798  "  8035  9833
MA87  2409  8399  10808
AP87  2724  H  9226  11950
MY87  2898  "  9139  12037
JN87  3311  H  9796  13107
JL87  3630  H  10523  14153
AG87  1  5277  "  11853  1  17130
SE87  I  5743  H  11859  '  17602
OC87  8040  H  13016  '  21056
Nb87  8086  "  14146  22232
D087  9117  "  16755  '  25872
JA88  11103  "  17488  28591
FE88  I  13152  H  20160  33312
MA88  '  12200  "  27318  39518
AP88  13997  "  31358  '  45355
MY88  15282  H  38226  53508
JN88  18572  H  47956  66528
JL88  22666  60905  83571
AG88  24503  "  80441  104944
SE88  21400  "  97737  119137
OC88  22629  H  107146  129775
N088  22635  H  118341  1  140975
DE88  1  23657  H  '30517  154174
JA89  28434  H  152794  181228
FE89  45542  H  1t0508  216050
MA89  76457  202606  '  279063
AP89  143719  H  307604  451323
MY89  207980  1'  707948  ,  915928
I  JN89  1  500913  "  1558682  ,  ?059595
JU89  ,  877854  ,'  2363255  ,  3241109
AU89  ,  912544  ,  3216690  ,  4129234
SE89  1  989721  ,  3767581  '  4757302
OC89  I  995725  ,,  4155349  '  5151074
N089  1432058  ,'  3743756  ,  5175814
28INTEREST  T  tREASURY  ::  CENTRAL  TOTAL
EARNING  DEBT  Date  DEBT  ::BANK DEBT  DEBT
OF  THE  PUBLIC  --  - ----------  - --------
SECTOR  DE85  389  4278  4668
(Millions  of  JA86  393  4223  4616
Dollars  at  the  FE86  395  H  4780  5175
Commercial  MA86  383  H  5360  5742
Exch.Rate)  AP86  378  H  4927  5306
INCLUDES  ONLY  MY86  356  5629  5985
INTERNAL  DEBT  JN86  343  H  5768  6111
JL86  340  H  5882  6223
TABLE  7  AG86  331  5974  6304
SE86  307 H  5950  6257
OC86  305  H  5135  5441
N086  287  H  5858  6145
DE86  1069  H  5831  6900
JA87  1289  H  5805  7094
FE87  1300  H  5809  7109
MA87  1563  H  5450  7014
AP87  1768  H  5987  7755
MY87  1822  H  5745  7566
JN87  1941  H  5741  7682
JL87  1916  H  5555  7472
AG87  2495  H  5604  8099
SE87  2337  H  4826  :  7163
OC87  2479  H  4013  6492
NO87  2304  4030  6334
DE87  2579  H  4740  7319
JA88  2872  H  4524  7396
FE88  3034  H  4651  7686
MA88  2510  H  5619  8129
AP88  2437  H  5459  7895
MY88  2269  H  5674  7943
JN88  2301  H  5941  :  8242
JL88  :  2348  H  6309  8657
AG88  2042  H  6703  8745
SE88  1783  H  8145  :  9928
OC88  1851  H  8766  10617
N088  1786 ::  9337  11123
DE88  1802  H  9943  :  11745
JA89  2081  H  11181  13262
FE89  3143  H  11766 :  14909
MA89  4999  H  13248  18247
AP89  2811  H  6017  8829
MY89  1671  H  5686  :  7357
JN89  2382  H  7411  9792
JU89  :  1546 ::  4163  :  5710
AU89  1393  H  4911  :  6304
SE89  1511 ::  5752  :  7263
OC89  1520  H  6344  7864
N089  2186  H  5716  7902
29TABLE  8
DOMESTIC  LIABILITIES  TOTAL  STOCK  OF  RATIO
OF  THE  CENTRAL  BANK  DOMESTIC  MONEY(m2)  (1)1(2)
(1)  (2)
DE85  8581  10033  0.86
JA86  8365  10538  0.79
FE86  8366  10971  0.76
MA86  9443  11517  0.82
AP86  9319  12079  0.77
MY86  10214  1'i44  0.78
JN86  10863  13840  0.78
JL86  11447  14675  0.78
AG86  12351  15336  0.81
SE86  12532  15876  0.79
OC86  11615  17288  0.67
N086  13184  18176  0.73
DE86  14015  20120  0.70
JA87  14867  21126  0.70
FE87  14978  21964  0.68
MA87  15593  23011  0.68
AP87  16619  24097  0.69
MY87  17286  25765  0.67
JN87  18082  27679  0.65
JL87  19717  29898  0.66
AG87  21095  31530  0.67
SE87  21568  34314  0.63
0C87  24881  38811  0.64
N087  26139  42602  0.61
DE87  30274  48075  0.63
JA88  31864  52343  0.61
FE88  33752  56984  0.59
MA88  42924  65494  0.66
AP88  48575  74191  0.65
MY88  58660  85827  0.68
JN88  71448  102730  0.70
JL88  92428  120617  0.77
AG88  117793  150250  0.78
SE88  143378  175167  0.82
OC88  155276  193011  0.80
N088  174917  215552  0.81
DE88  200514  259270  0.77
JA89  221780  287405  0.77
FE89  243199  315141  0,77
MA89  277949  368864  0.75
(*)  Millions  of  Current  Australes.  End  of  month  data.
Source:  M2  data  from  FIEL;  Remunerated  CB  liabilities  from  IBRD;
Non  Remunerated  Monetary  Base  from  IFS.
30V. THE DEMAND FOR MONEY AND THE LIMITS TO THE INFLATION TAX
Households have a oure transactions demand for real cash
balances of local currency, which we can expect to be positively
related to real income and negatively related to the cost of
holding those balances, that is, the expected rate of inflation.
In this module, we assume that the expected rate of inflation
equals its realized value in the current period.
To know the demand for real cash balances is critically
important to estimate the effect on inflation of deficit-induced
money creation, as well as to estimate the limits  of this means
of financing.
Given the level and volatility of the Argentine rates of
inflation, as well as the unending series of more or less radical
changes in monetary policy, one would not expect to find stable
demand-for-money parameters for extended periods of time. This
means that we should expect to see the revenue maximizing rate of
inflation, and the maximum revenue itself, changing over time.
For this reason, we have chosen here to estimate de demand for
real cash balances using two different approaches:
(1) Using a sample of monthly data for the period January 1984-
June 1988. This period covers from the return to democracy to the
onset of the Primavera Stabilization Plan, which ended in the
first hyperinflationary episode of 1989. The most important
monetary event of this period was the Austral Stabilization plan,
launched in June 1985.
(2) Using long term series of annual data (1960-1988)  allowing
for a time dependent dummy variable to capture the possibility of
a  structural change taking place.  We found that an additive
dummy variable (D77) taking the value of one for 1977 onwards
(and zero otherwise) captures best the structural change that
took place as a consequence of the financial liberalization  of
1977.
The estimation on the basis of monthly data precludes the
use of income series to estimate a velocity function.
Consequently, we estimate a demand for real cash balances with
the inflation rate as the only explanatory variable in our
regressions. To avoid the simultaneous determinatiop problem
(between current period real cash balances and current perird
inflation),  we have used a Two Stage Least Squares estimation
procedure using lagged inflation up to three per ods as
instruments. TSLS is also used in the estimation using annual
data.
31Tables 9  and 10 report the regression results for the
annual and monthly data respectively.
In Figure 9 we can appreciate the significant changes that
have occurred over time in the demand for real Ml as measured by
its velocity of circulationr.  From 1960 through 1974 velocity
remained  approximately stable in the range of 6-7. In 1975
velocity starts an upward trend that does not show signs of
stopping, taking it to a value of 33 in 1988. Unofficial data
estimates put velocity around 50 as of the second half of 1989,
after the hyperinflation of June-July of that year.  The raise of
1975-76  may have been caused by the high price instability  during
those two years; we have reasons to believe, however, that a
structural change took place in 1977, when interest rates were
totally freed for the first time in decades and the public could
invest in short term time deposits at market determined interest
rates. This structural change is bound to reduce the real demand
for Ml as the supply of alternative assets was now open. Our
empirical results confirm this presumption as the value for the
structural change dummy is of 0.67, meaning that there was a 95%
(exp(.67)-1) upward shift in velocity due to the financial
liberalization experience.
The estimates from the monthly data yield long run
estimates of the semi-log elasticity (coefficient  al corrected
for the effect of lig'ged  Ml) ranging between -2.83 and -3.01,
implying a monthly revenue maximizing inflation rate between 33%-
35%.  The regression using annual data yields a comparable
estimate for al of -4.54, compatible with a maximum revenue rate
of 21.9% per month./All of the above estimates of maximum revenue
inflation rate shodld be subtracted the monthly real growth rate
if any real growth is to be assumed./
Our estimates of the semi-log elasticity of demand for Ml
fall within the range of other empirical studies. For example,
Kiegel and Neumayer(1989), using monthly data for the period July
1982-March 1985, find values for al in the range -2.4 -3.8. Their
estimates of al for the fixed exchange rate period of the Tabla
Cambiaria (Jan.1979-January 1981),  when there was a high degree
of capital mobility, yields somehow higher estimates in the range
of -4.9 -6.0 .
In order to estimate the possible range for the revenue
from money creation we have decided to use the results from the
regression using annual data since this allows for a direct
estimate of velocity.
32FIGURE  9
ANNUAL  UELOCITY  OF  CIRCULATION  OF  Ml
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TABLE  9
ANNOAL  MONEY  DEMAND  FUNCTION
LV  =  aO +  al.INF
LV  Ln(GDP/M1)
V  Annual  Velocity  of Circulation  of MI.
GDP=  Annual  Nominal  GDP
M1=  Average  of Monthly  holdings  of Nominal  Ml.
INF= Equivalent  monthly  inflation  rate for the  year.
D77=  Financial  reform  dummy  (1 from  1977-88,  0 otherwise)
SAMPLE=  1960-1988
METHOD:  Two-Stage  Least  Squares
INSTRUMENTS:  INF(-1)  INF(-2)  LV(-1)  D77
LV =  1.9090  +  4.5484  INF +  0.67087  D77
(49.49)  (5.83)  (9.89)
MA(1)  = 0.925  (T-value=3.98)




MON1thLY  MONEY  DEMAND  REGRESSIONS
LM1  - C  +  aO  LM1(-l)  +  al  INF
LM1-  Lri(Ml/CPI)
INF  - CPI/CPI  1) -1
SAMPLE:  Monthly  1984.02-1988.06
RFG.5  REG.6  REG.7
C  13.213  13.185  8.202
(195)  (346)  (5.4)
LM1(-1)  ---  ---  0.378
(3.29)
INF  -3.01  -2.85  -1.763
(-6.04)  (-10.2)  (-4.29)




ESTIMATED  LONG  RUN
Al  COEFFICIENT  -3.01  -2.85  -2.83
R2  ADJ.:  0.61  0.67  0.81
D-W.:  1.31  1.92  1.89
F:  42  55.9  75
METHOD  OF  ESTIMATION:  TWO  STAGE  LEAST  SQUARES
INSTRUMENTS:  INF(-1)  INF(-2)  INF(-3)  and  LMI(-l)  (only  in R7).
34Computing the Maximum Revenue from Money Creation
In this section we shall be concerned with the derivation
of an estimate of the relation between monetary financing of the
deficit and the resulting inflation rate. In particular, we will
derive an estimate of the maximum revenue that can be obtained
from the inflation tax before the economy enters into
hyperinflation.
Consider a demand for high power money of the following
form:




M=Stock of High Power Money.
By issuing high power money, the government can finance part
of its current expenditures in tha amount (dM/dt)/p. As a
fraction of GDP, the Pevenue from money creation is.
(V2) IR = {-(1/V)(dV/dt) +  (  I  +  g ))/  V(Ie)
We shall be concerned here with the possibility  of
sustainable deficit financing from the inflation tax. Leaving
aside the transitory effects derived from the transition from one
equilibrium to another, the sustainable steady rate of deficit
financing through the inflation tax is derived from (V2) assuming
that velocity remains constant at the level determined by the
actual inflation rate and we also assume that expectations have
adjusted so that actual and expected inflation rates are
identical.  Under those circumstances, the steady-state
sustainable revenue from inflation becomes:
(V3)  IR =  (I +  g)/V(I)
There is a maximum to the amount of revenue  that can be
raised  with the inflation tax before generating a hyper1nflation.
This amount corresponds to the solution to the maximum value for
the equation:  Max.Inf.Tax=  max (I+g)/V(I).  Attempts to raise a
higher revenue than this maximum will require ever increasing
rates of money creation and inflation.
35Assume the following form for the velocity function:
(V4)  Log(V)  =  Vo  +  b.I
In terms of the standard form for Velocity shown in (V4),
the steady state revenue from inflation is:
(V5)  IR  - (I+g)/V(I)  =  (I+g).Exp[-Vo  - bI]
The function IR takes a maximum when
(V6)  d(IR)/dI  =  Exp[ -Vo  - bIl  -(I+g).b.Exp[-Vo-bI]  =  0
The solution to this expression yields the maximum revenue
inflation tax:
(V7)  Imax  /bl-g,
as the continuous time rate of inflation over the period over
which velocity is defined.
The corresponding Maximum Revenue is derived as:
(V8)  IRmax = Exp[-Vo-1+b.g]/b ,
It is clear from the above analysis that (V5) is valid
provided the expression in brackets is less than IRmax. Any
deficit in excess of IRmax. cannot be financed through the
inflation tax as (V5) will not have a solution, meaning that ever
increasing rates of monetary expansion, and inflation,  will be
necessary to finance it and the system would enter into
hyperinflation.
The estimate of money demand using annual data yields the
following expression for the sustainable revenue from the
inflation  tax as percentage of annual GDP:
36IR =  12* (INF +  g)*exp(  -2.5798  - 4.5484*INF)
where INF and g are the equivalent monthly inflation and growth
rates and IR is the annual revenue from the inflation  tax as a
fraction of annual income.
Assuming a real growth rate of 2% per year, g takes a
value of 0.00165 per month. With this value for g, the rate of
monthly inflation that maximizes R/Y is equal to:
INF*  =  (1/b)  - g =  0.2184
This maximum revenue rate is equal to 21.8% per month, an
amount equivalent to 966% per year.  The associated maximum
revenue from money creation is equal to 7.4% of GDP and velocity
at this inflation rate takes the value of 35.5.
To illustrate the workings of the maximum inflation tax
assume a GDP of 70 billion dollars (about the level of GDP in
1989). With velocity at about 36, money demand is 1945 mil  in
dollars. With a monthly inflation rate of 21.8%, revenue from
inflation is 424 million dollars per month (  .218*1945) or 5088
million per year that is equivalent to 7.3% of annual GDP.
It should be not,Ced that as the inflation rate approaches
INF*, the revenue function becomes increasingly  elastic with
respect to the inflation rate. This means tnat small changes in
revenue require large changes in inflation. In the limit,  as the
revenue reaches the maximum level, there is no increase in the
inflation rate capable to generate any sustainable increase in
the rate of revenue. Figure 10  shows the relation between
revenue and inflation derived from our estimated revenue function
above and assuming a growth rate of 2% per year.  The Figure
shows that here there is little  gain and much costs from raising
inflation above levels  of 10% per month. At 10% per month the
revenue is about 6% of annual GDP. Raising the maximum extra
amount possible of 1.3% requires increasing  the inflation rate
from 10% to 21.8% per month. Therefore, in the margin, the extra
1.3% point of GDP in additional revenue requires increasing the
annual inflation rate from 213% to 966%. Raising the first six
points of revenue only  needs 213% inflation.
37FIGURE  10
Annual Revenue  from  Inflation  ana  the  Monthl  Inflation  Rate
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In conclusion, our estimate for the money demand eauation
for Argentina yields an estimate of the maximum-revenue inflation
tax of about 22% per month and a maximum revenue of 7.-% of GDP.
The revenue estimate should be modifi-d if all of the tax on Ml
is not collected by the monetary authorities. As of December 1988
the monetary base was 52 billion Australes and Ml was 53 billion
australes suggesting that our estimate of tha revenue from
inflation is approximately correct since the Ml multiplier of the
monetary base is about unity.
38VI. PUBLIC  DEBT  AND  INTEREST  RATE  DETERMINATION
VI.1 Short-Run Analysis
There are two financial markets in Argentina, the formal
market and the informal  one. The informal  market consists of the
''mercado  interempresario" (interfirm financial market) where
firms borrow and lend among themselves through a set of
institutions  called "money-market desks". No record on the volume
of these transactions exists although newspapers do quote the
interest rates at which transactions are settled in this market.
There is no accepted estimate as to the size of this market and
most of the transactions are done on a one to seven days basis.
The formal financial market is concentrated in the
commercial banks and financieras, both subject to Central Bank
regulation, which includes the right to the deposit guarantee ano
the obligation to establish reserve requirements.  The foremost
instrument on the borrowing side of the banks and financieras is
the interest  earning Time Deposit. From time to time a variety of
other in-truments  have been offered to the public, including  a
wide range of indexed deposits (indexed  to the dollar, CPI or
some of the components of the price index).  Time deposits are
sold to the rublic and traditionally bear a maturity ranging from
7 to 30 days. The average maturity for the deposits of the system
has rarely  exceeded 14 days and in recent years has been close to
seven days. During 1989, following several episodes of long
weekends coupled by forced bank holidays it has been not uncommon
to have days in which 90% of the Time Deposits of the system came
due on a single day.
Banks use their deposits to grant credit to the private
sector or to acquire Central Bank assets (some compulsorily and
some voluntarily). In 1989, about 80% of all assets of the
commercial banks consisted of liabilities  of the Central Bank.
Regulations on how are those Central Bank liabilities  remunerated
have changed through time but on average we can say that these
liabilitiec  have paid an interest  rate equal to the average cost
to the commercial banks of raising the funds plus a spread. We
have detected evidence that in some instances Banks were
interested in having their liquid funds absorbed by the Central
Bank through increases in remunerated reserve requirements. In a
country subject to the uncertainties of Argentina, it  may
actually be safer to lend to the one entity that regulates the
industry (the Central Bank), particularly when such lending is
done at the cost of obtaining the funds plus a profitable spread
(on the dynamics of the financial system that lead to the
hyperinflation of 1989, see Almansi and Rodriguez (1989)  and
Fernandez(1990).
39From the  above  description  we can  jump to the conclusion
that  for  all practical  purposes  commercial  banks  raise  deposits
in order  to lend  them  to the Cetntral Bank.  The  rate paid  by the
Central  Bank  is the cost  of obtaining  those  deposits  plus a
spread  that allows  banks  to runi  its costs  of operation  plus
profits.  The  result  of such operations  was  a grossly  distorted
financial  system  in which  about  2500  bank branches  with  140000
employees  administered  an amount  of  4700 million  dollars  of
deposits  as of December  1989  (or 33600  dollars  per employee).
After  the melt  down of January  1990,  approximately  the  same
number  of employees  were  trying  to retain  their  jobs when  the
amount  of bank  deposits  was  reduced  to only  1384 million  dollars
which  means  about  9885 dollars  of deposits  per  bank employee!.
About  one  half of  the bank deposits  and the employees  are  in
state  banks,  which  obviously  should  lead in a restructuring  of
the Argentine  financial  system.  Such  restructuring  has  not yet
taken  place  in spite  of the grossly  oversized  financial  system.
In such  a system  it is very difficult  to ascertain  what  is
the mechanism  through  which  the  interest  rate on deposits  is
determined.  One  could  say  that  the marginal  20% of private
borrowers  will  generate  a tendency  for  rates  to approximate  the
productivity  of  investment  but  this  is not so. Most  of the
private  creditors  are  borrowing  on a daily  basis  to finance
temporary  financial  disequilibria  through  the use of overdraft  on
their  checking  accounts  and not  for  investment  purposes.
The  interest  rate appears  to be determined  by the short
run  liquidity  available  in the system.
We have  found  a significant  relation  between  the  stock  of
time deposits  outstanding  and  the  level of the  real  interest  rate
that  these  deposits  yield.  The  general  rule for banks  in
determining  interest  rates  is to set  them at the  level  required
for all  deposits  (principal  plus  interest)  to be rolled  over
unless  the Central  Bank  intervenes  by providing  the  required  cash
for the  banks  to  reduce  the outstanding  level of deposits.
In terms  of the standard  money-supply  multipliers,  the
monetary  base of the Central  Bank  (its  liabilities)  is equal  to
the sum  of reserve  requirements:
(VI.1)  MB  = al MI +  a2 D  ,
40where al is the average reserve requirement on Ml, very close to
unity since the reserve requirement on demand deposits has tended
to equal unity. The coefficient a2 of reserve requirements  on
interest earning deposits (D) is also close to unity as a result
of the policy of the Central Bank of gradually absorbing most of
the lending capability of commercial banks.
The demand for Ml is assumed to take the form:
(VI.2)  M1= p L(pie), where pie is expected inflation.
The demand  for real interest earnirg bank deposits
depends on the expected real return to be earned
(VI.3)  D/p  =  d(i  - pie)
The growth rate of the tstal monetary base, in turn
equals:
(VI.4)  d(MB)/dt = (i+s).a2.D +  DEF
where s is the spread paid over the cost to the banks of raising
the deposits and DEF is the financing needs of the non financial
public sector.
Equations (VI.1) to (VI.3)  are not enough to determine
the four endogenous variables: Ml, D, p and i. The fourth missing
equation is the key to determine the interest rate. This equation
depends on the structure of operation of financial markets. If
there is still enough link with the real sector through bank
credit, we can assume that the real interest rate is determined
by the marginal productivity of capital. Given inflationary
expectations, this condition determines i, and the equations
(VI.l)-(VI.3)  will determine the remaining variables Ml, D and p.
If there is perfect capital mobility the real interest
rate will be determined by the external rate and therpfore also
the nominal interest rate will be exogenously determined given
inflationary  expectations.
41For the most recent years (1982-1989), however, the
cu-rency in general has not been convertible and we do not
observe any close link between the productivity of capital and
the cost of bank credit. For practical purposes, most of bank
credit goes to the Central Bank who simply pays the cost of
raising it.  In such a system we are still missing one behavioral
equation. Such equation is given by the policy  of the Central
Bank with respect to the level or the cost of its interest
earning debt. The growth rate of the Central Bank debt depends on
the interest rate and the composition of the Total Monetary Base
between remunerated and non-remunerated liabilities.  We advance
the hypothesis that the Central Bank  at times aims at the
control of  the ratio of remunerated to non remunerated  Monetary
Base so that its total liabilities  grow at the desired rate.
This means that at a point in time the total amount of interest
earning deposits in the system is fixed in nominal terms. Since
the public can freely shift from D to Ml, the constancy of D
means that banks must offer whatever interest rate is needed to
induce the public to roll-over all of its deposits at a point in
time (principal plus interest).
The alternative to the prior mechanism is to aim at
keeping constant the nominal interest rate by allowing depositors
to shift freely between Ml and interest earning deposits.
Consiider  the trade off faced by the Central Bank when
there is a fall in demahd for interest earning deposits. The bank
has the option of keeping the interest rate constant by allowing
depositors to convert all of their excess supply of D into Ml. If
that is done, however, the price level must jump given that the
real demand for Ml has not changed. Therefore, if there is a fall
in interest earning deposits and the Central Bank feeds the run
by substituting non-remunerated for remunerated  monetary base,
the price level increases (or, in  more day-to-day terms, the
currency devalues in the black market). This behavior
characterizes the periods of low interest rates and high black
market premium.
The alternative is to keep Ml and D constant and to allow
the nominal interest rate to adjust so that the run is stopped by
raising the return on deposits.  The higher real interest rate
reduces pressures in the parallel foreign exchange market and the
black market premium initially falls. In this case there is no
effect on Ml (we have assumed it depends only on expected
inflation, otherwise, some minor adjustment to the following
story should be made, but the thrust of the analysis will not be
changed) but since the nominal interest rate has increased,  the
growth rate of the monetary base is now higher (according to
(VI.4)). This behavior characterizes periods of high real
42interest rates and low black market premium for the currency.
This situation is however, unsustainable as the monetary base
starts growing at rates inconsistent  with price stability and the
black market exchange rate starts to depreciate.  Eventually the
system breaks down as the Central Bank is forced to devalue the
official exchange rate and to allow the raise in Ml in order to
reduce interest rates and the pressure of the quasi-fiscal
deficit.
The inherently unstable system implies  wide oscillations
in real interest rates and the real exchange rate as depositors
try to anticipate sudden devaluations (the preferred instrument
for the melting down of the quasifiscal deficits) by exchanging
their deposits for cash with which to buy dollars in the black
market. If the government tries to stop the portfolio shift it
must resort to higher interest rates in order to force the roll
over of the deposits. This mechanism reduces the short run
pressures on the currency but increases the rate of growth of the
monetary base and therefore generates expectations of even larger
devaluations. The run feeds on itself  until authorities give up
to pressures and devalue.
VI.2  Empirical Estimates
The magnitude o'f  the changes in the interest rate needed
to accommodate fluctuations in the demand for deposits is bound
to depend on the interest elasticity of such demand. The more
inelastic the demand is, the larger should be the required
increase in the interest rate necessary to induce the roll over
of the deposits in the face of an exogenous fall in the demand
for them. We have attempted to estimate this elasticity using
data for the period following the financial reform of 1977 since
then it took place a fundamental structural change by allowing
the free market determination of interest rates. The result  was
an unprecedented change in the ratio of M2 to MI as a result of
an increase in the demand for the former and a fall in the demand
for the latter as it can be appreciated in Figure 11 showing the
time path of the (M2-M1)/M1 ratio. The increase in the ratio of
interest earning deposits to Ml started in 1977 and was
approximately completed by mid-1980. Since then this ratio has
oscillated in response to the relative returns to both assets.
43FIGURE 11: RATIO OF INTEREST EARNING DEPOSITS TO MI
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Regression (at in Table 11 shows the estimates of the real
demand for interest earning deposits using OLS estimation method
and monthly data covering the period 1978.01-1988.12.  Regression
(b) estimates the same demand for the later subperiod 1984.01-
1988.12.  We assume the real demand for deposits depends on the
current month nominal interest rate and the expected inflation
rate. The regressions shown use the current period inflation rate
as the measure of the expected inflation rate. No significant
changes were found when the next period inflation that actually
took place was used.  The high value and significance of the
coefficient for the lagged  endogenous variable strongly indicates
the presence of a  slow adjustment process. Regressions (a) and
(b) are made with OLS estimation methods and use the data for the
longer and shorter periods respectively.  Regression (c) is done
for the longer period using instrumental  variables in order to
correct for the problem of simultaneous determination of interest
rates and inflation rates.
44In all cases the sign of the nominal interest rates and
inflation rate is equal to what was theoretically expected: the
nominal interest rates come out as positive and the inflation
rate comes out as negative and with an absolute value equal to
that of the interest rate. Ihe results confirm the presumption
that the demand for real deposits depends on the real interest
rate paid on them. The coefficients are significant at the 1%
confidence level and do not differ, in the OLS estimations, in
absolute value between the two periods, indicating that no
significant structural change took place along those 10 post-
financial reform years.
The estimates for the longer period using instrumental
variables ,Regression (c), remain highly significant but their
absolute values for the interest elasticity are higher than in
the OLS estimate. In this case the semi-log interest elasticity
with respect to the monthly real interest rate is about 1.1 in
the short run and 11 in the long run. These estimates mean that a
10% fall in the demand for deposits requires, for them to be
rolled over, an increase of 9 percentage points in the monthly
interest rate in the short run and 0.9 percentage points in the
long run.  Unfortunately, the instrumental  variables technique
did not yield satisfactory results for the later period, probably
because the instruments used could not capture the sharp
fluctuations experienced in both nominal interest rates and
inflation rates during  Ihis period.
In the system we have described above, the real interest
rate on time deposits of the institutionalized  financial system
depends on a delicate equilibrium between expectations of melt
downs and the need of the government to refinance its debt with
the financial system that is the counterpart  of most of the
interest earning deposits at the commercial banks.
If we assume that the government controls the rate of
devaluation and can always outsmart the market by devaluing by
more than what was expected, we arrive to the conclusion that to
a certain extent the government determines the ex-post real rate
of interest. The ex-post real interest rate in the financial
system is basically determined by the only significant creditor
of the system: the Central Bank. This is certainly not done on a
monthly basis but it is actually obtained through the inevitable
melt-downs that systematically take place.
45TABLE  11
DEMAND  ESTIMATES  FOR  INTEREST  EARNING  DEPOSITS
LOG(D/P)  = C  +  A1.LOG(D/P)(-1)  +  A2.INT  +  A3.INF
D=  M2-M1  (Interest  earning  deposits  from  FIEL  databank)
P=  Consumer  Price  Index
INT=  Nominal  Interest  on  Deposits,  monthly  basis  (IFS  Line  60L)
R(a)  R(b)  R(c)
C  0.981  0.758  0.991
(4.6)  (2.1)  (4.0)
Al  0.929  0.946  0.928
(60)  (35)  (51)
A2  0.629  0.524  1.10
(6.0)  (3.92)  (3.59)
A3  -0.765  -0.659  1.09
(-9.6)  (-6.2)  (-4.52)
R2  ADJ.:  0.977  0.964  0.973
D-W  1.72  1.87  1.83
F  1876  530  1601
N:  132  60  132
PERIOD:  1978.01/  1984.01/  1978.01/
1988.12  1988.12  1988.12
METHOD:  OLS  OLS  TSLS
Instruments  for  Regression  (c):  Log(DP-1),INF(-1),INF(-2),INT(-1)
INT(-2)
46Why do depositors agree to remain into such an uncertain
asset?. Partly because they are systematically tempted with
attractive ex-ante real interest rates.  Devaluations always
happen, but they are usually done by the newly appointed
Minister, the previous Minister having been just fired because of
his now obvious policy mistakes!.  Why do people believe in the
new Minister and accept from the begining the roll over of the
remaining deposits in spite of having been just melted down
remains unexplained. The fact is that credibility in new
Ministers is decreasing over time as the same experiment is
repeated over and over again.
Consider the initial  nominal interest rates after the last
full-fledged stabilization plans, all of which were based on a
large devaluation promised to be the last ever. The Austral Plan
(June 1985) devalued by 40% and the interest rate  immediately
after the devaluation was around 7% per month. The Primavera Plan
(August 1988) devalued by 24% and the resulting interest rate was
around 10%. The Bunge Born I plan devalued by 200% and the
initial interest rate was set at 17%. The Bunge and Born Plan II
(December 1989)  devalued by 54% and the initial interest rate
after the devaluation was around 60% per month.  Finally, in
January 1989, the Erman Plan converted mandatorily all Time
Deposits into a 10 year dollar denominated government bond (that
started trading at about 30-40% of par value) and the interest
rate in the initial iays  was around 100%. In the days prior to
the announcement of the Erman Plan, monthly interest rates
reached levels of 600% per month for large depositors because of
the expectations of a forthcoming melt down. After the melt down,
that took place on January 2 1990, interest rates only fell to
100% per month which is an indicator of how little  confidence the
market still had in the success of this new plan.
It is clear  that the institutionalized  credit market in
Australes performs no significant role insofar as the generation
of new credit. All of the potential credit tends to be absorbed
by the government as a result of the need to finance its deficits
and since 1985, at least, its primary role has been that of
refinancing the stock of public debt that has its counterpart in
the stock of bank deposits. A change may have taken place after
March 1990, when the government announced still another fiscal
adjustment effort and a reform of the Charter of the Central Bank
started to be devised for the second time in less than a year. It
is however still too soon to open judgement of the ppssibilities
of success of this new set of promises.
47There  has  b6el?  an additional  source  o';  redit  to the
government  in Argentina  provided  by the  issuance  of different
types  of Ireasury  debt  an(i  Central  Bank  instruments  that are
either  indexed  to prices  or most  commonly  to the dollar.  One  such
kind  of government  paper  is the series  of bonds  denominated
BONEX,  that  started  being  issued  in 1980.  lhese  BONEX  pay LIBO
rate,  have  a tern  year maturity  and usually  trade  below  par  in
spite  of the  fact  that  all BONEX  have been  regularly  served  so
far.  The  internal  rate of return  on the  BONEX  (if hold  to
maturity)  is usually  taken  as a measure  of the marginal  cost of
borrowing  in  dollars  for-  Argentina.
BONEX  have  a strong  demand  by Argentines  as they are
widely  held  as collateral  for  loans  in the  informal  financial
market.  Since  BONEX  can  ue legally  traded  in secondary  markets
for either  Australes  or dollars,  they are  the mechanism  through
which  firms  and  individuals  can  buy or sell dollars  legally
(holding  dollars  is legal, transacting  them at the free market
rate  has been  usually  illegal,  and  the  BONEX  provides  the way  for
doing  it legally).  Because  of  its wide  acceptability,  the  IRR of
the BONEX  provides  us withi  a good  measure  of the equilibrium
dollar  interest  rate  in Argentina  as the  other  dollar  or indexed
rates  tend to use  the BONEX  rate as the  preferred  reference  rate.
Most  other  instruments  that are  subject  to devaluation  risk, or
have  dubious  possibility  of collection,  pay  rates higher  than the
BONEX  IRR. The  BONEX  rate puts  a floor  on other  dollar  rates  in
the  informal  system  as nobody  would  lend  in Argentina  at less
than this  rate  that  is supposed  to be the preferred  rate for  the
Argentine  market.
The  IRBONEX  (IRR on the BONEX)  has shown  significantly
less variability  than  the ex-post  realized  dollar  rate on Austral
deposits.  Both  rates  are shown  in Figure  12.
Presently  the  stock  of outstanding  BONEX  (series from  1980
up to 1987)  stays  at about  2200 million  dollars,  an amount  larger
than  the dollar  value  of Ml  (as of January  1990). The  BONEX  rate
sets  the  reference  rate for  an even  wider  informal  market  for
dollar  indexed  operations.  The BONEX  rate  is not affected  by
exchange  rate expectations  (it  is already  set  in dollars)  and  is
the  last of the  assets  that the market  expects  to be melted  down
by default.  Changes  in the BONEX  rate can  be assumed,to  be
determined  by changes  in world  dollar  rates  and  in the
creditworthiness  of the Government.
48FIGURE  12
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The creditworthiness of the Government is not something to
be taken for granted. The Government has stopped serving its
external debt with commercial banks since 1987 and this debt
traded at below 20% of par in 1988 (it fell to 12% in  early
1990).  The BONEX trades at parities above 70% because it  has
attained some type of a preferred status when the moment of
servicing the debt comes about. Other supposedly preferred
instruments have already been subject to forced refinancing  and
melting down, such as the LEDOL, a 90-day dollar bill issued  by
the Central Bank in August 1989 that was refinanced compulsorily
with a Treasury bond with 10 years maturity that immediately
started trading at 30% of par. Before it  could even be issued,
the Treasury Bond was changed in January for the new issue  of
BONEX 1989 used to purchase most of the outstarnding  Austral
denominated government debt (and the plazo fijos) under the Erman
I plan of January 2, 1990.
49ihe best measure for the creditworthiness of the
government is its ability to generate a fiscal surplus relative
to its level of indebtedness. As w?  have already seen, the
government has systematically been runninq a primary deficit in
recent years. As a result, the government was eventually forced
to practically default on its external debt, a process that
starts gradually in 1982. The service of the BONEX actually
competes with all other instruments  of the internal debt. We
therefore propose the existence of a positive trade-off between
the Internal Rate of Return on the BONEX and the stock of
Internal Debt of the Government.  In addition, we would expect
also that the BONEX rate be related to the opportunity cost of
external funds as measured by a risk free rate such  as PRIME or
LIBOR.
In defining the relative value of the stock of government
debt three deflators come to mind: the price level and the
official and free market exchange rate. We have found that the
official exchange rate is the deflator that yields the best
econometric results in the sense that the real stock of debt
(measured in dollars at  the official exchange rate) is the one
measure  best associated to the interest rate on BONEX. This may
be explained by the fact that much of the stock of government
debt was generated by the Central Bank as a result of attempts to
maintain constant the nominal value of the official exchange
rate. The dollar value of the stock of debt in terms of dollar at
the official exchange rate is therefore a measure of the
pressures against the sustainability of such a rate. The higher
is the stock of government debt evaluated at the official
exchange rate, the less likely that the current set of policies
may be maintained and therefore the risk premium of lending  to
the government increases.
The regression results assessing the link between the
BONEX rate and the stock of internal government debt are shown
below in Table 12. The regression estimates indicate a strong
effect of the level of the government debt on the BONEX rate. In
the long run, a 10% increase in the dollar value of the
government debt results in an increase  of 3.2 percentage points
in thie  annual BONEX rate.
50The external interest rate, measured by the monthly  U.S.
PRIME rate did not come out as significant in previous
regressions so that it is not included there. Part of the reason
may be due to the fact that since 1982 the country has not had
access to external credit and therefore one should not expect any
link between domestic and external interest rates. The fact is,
however, that Argentines do hold considerable amounts of their
assets in terms of foreign exchange. There are estimates of
holdings in excess of 30 Billion dollars by Argentines in foreign
assets (as compared to 2-3 billion for Ml in local currency).
Since Argentines can freely shift the composition  of their
portfolio between foreign assets and local paper, we should
expect some association between the local and ext3rnal interest
rates. We have no doubt that such a relationship  exists, excapt
that it is difficult to capture it statistically for a short
period such as the one analyzed here and where the PRIME rate did
not experience any significant variation as compared with the
sharp oscillations in the BONEX rate that were induced  by changes
in the market's evaluation of tne risk of lenL'ng to the
government.
FIGURE 13
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51TABLE  12
THE  BONEX  RATE  AND  GOVERNMENT  INTERNAL  DEBT
IRRBONFx= -9.13 +  0.797 IRRBONEX(-1) +  6.53 Log(DGCOM)
(-2.5)  (11.7)  (3.37)
DGCOM: Dollar value of the stock of internal public debt
evaluated at t.he  Commercial Exchange Rate.





Correction for first order autocorrelation did not yield a
statistically significant AR(1) and it is therefore not reported
here. The Durwin H test also does not show any significant
autocorrelation.
PERIOD: 1986.04 1989.09
52VI.3  lnterest Rates and Inflation in the Steady State
In the previous section we have been concerned about the
short run trade-off between nominal and real interest rates and
the Central Bank policy about the composition of its debt between
remunerated and non-remunerated. We shall now describe the long
run steady state trade off between interest rates and government
debt poli_y.
In order to focus on the essential elements of the process,
mainly that interest is being paid on money by means of printing
more money, we will assume there is a 100% reserve requirements
on both remunerated, D, and nonremunerated, Ml, money. Under this
assumption, we can write the monetary base, MB, as follows:
(5)  MB = M1 + D
We also assume the following behavioral relationships
between the demand for the two kinds of monies, and the inflation
and nominal interest rates:
(6)  Ml = P.L(pi),  L'<O
(7)  D =  P.F(i-pi),  F'>0
The change over time of the monetary base is given by:
(8)  d(MB)/dt = i.D +  def,
where the variable def represents the nominal budget deficit, and
i.D represents the Central Bank's remuneration  of the interest-
bearing deposits D.
The real budget deficit, g, is of course given by:
(VI.)  g =  def/P
Finally, we use the Fisher equation to define the real
interest rate, R, as follows:
53(VI.10)  R  =  i  - pi,
In the steady-state the following equality must hold:
(VI.11)  (d(MB)/dt).(1/MB) =  pi
Dividing (VI.8) by MB, and using (VI.9), we can write:
(VI.12)  (d(MB)/dt).(1/MB) =  i.D/MB +  g.P/MB
From (VI.5), (VI.6), and (VI.7), we can express the real monetary
base as:
(VI.13)  MB/P  =  L(pi)  +  F(R)
Hence, using (VI.7), (VI.10), (VI.12) and (VI.13)  we can
rewrite the steady-state equilibrium condition, (VI.11), as
follows:
(VI.14)  L(pi).pi =  F(R).R +  g
In an economy where the real sector, or the international
capital market, determines the real interest rate, the
equilibrium condition established by equation (VI.14) determines
the inflation rate. The equilibrium inflation rate is the one
which delivers the inflation-tax revenue required to pay for the
real budget deficit, 9, and the real service of the Central
Banks's debt (the real quasifiscal deficit), F(R)R.
There are, of course, real interest  rates for which equation
(VI.14) has no solution. This corresponds to the situation where
the amount of resources required by the sum of the two deficits
exceeds the maximum stationary inflation tax.
There will normally be many real interest rates for which
there are two solutions for (VI.14). For these cases we assume
that the monetary authority chooses the lowest inflation-rate,  or
efficient, solution. This assumption is important bec4use -as we
will see next- it determines the sign of the equilibrium
relationship between the real interest rate and the inflation
rate. Differentiating (VI.14)  we observe that along the steady-
state equilibrium relationship between r an pi we must have:
54(VI.15)  d(pi)/d(R) = (F+R.F')/(L+pi.L')
As long as the economy stays on the efficient side of the
inflation-tax Laffer curve, the right hand side of (VI.15)  must
be positive -that is, to an increase in the real interest rate it
corresponds arn  increase in the equilibrium inflation rate.
It is obvious from our model that in an economy where the
real secto- does not determine the real interest rate, the
financial sector alone cannot determine both the real interest
rate and the inflation rate. The financial sector provides us
with one equation, (VI.14), but we have two unknowns, R and pi.
The Argentine economy seems to be precisely such kind of an
economy. In one hand, the supply of loanable funds comes from
deposits, both remunerated and non remunerated, that people hold
not as an alternative investment but just for liquidity reasons.
In the other hand, the demand for loanable funds is related just
to the short-term liquidity needs of business firms. Saving and
investment in Argentina -the capital market- no longer  function
in local currency.
As we describe in this paper, the Argentine monetary
authorities tried to use the apparent degree of freedom provided
by the lack of connection between the financial market and the
real sector during the 1982-1989 period, to manipulate the real
interest rate in ordgr to control the composition  of the Central
Bank's liabilities. Idi  particular, they have tried to prevent the
expansion of the Central Bank's nonremunerated liabilities  by
rising the real interest rate as much as required by the market
to hold remunerated liabilities. This has been done under the
belief that it is only the expansion of the nonremunerated
liabilities  what causes prices to rise over time.
The result of this monetary policy has been a sort of
'unpleasant  monetarist arithmetic," because by rising the real
interest rate they have increased the required inflation-tax
revenue, thus making necessary an increase in the equilibrium
inflation rate.
By choosing the composition of its liabilities  between
remunerated and non-remunerated the Central Bank chooses  a point
in the trade-off given by (VI.15). This can be seen by dividing
(VI.7) by (VI.6) and denoting by a to the ratio of remuneraLad to
non-remunerated Central Bank debt. The relationship Cetween a, pi
and R  is  given by:
(V1.16) a =  F( R  )/L(pi)
55Assuminq the equilibrium is at the efficient side of the
Laffer revenue curve, (VI.14) describes an upward slopping
relationship between R and pi. For a given a, (VI.16) describes a
downward slopping relation between R and pi. The intersection  of
both schedules determines the unique steady state values of R and
pi. A higher a is associated with a rightward shift in the
downward slopping schedule (VI.16) and tnerefore with a higher R
and pi in the new steady state.
The nature of the trade off between remunerated debt and
inflation is now clear. Irn  the short run, increasing a  (reducing
liquidity by issuing interest  earning debt) helps reduce
pressures on inflation. In the long run, the rate of nominal
monetary expansion must be higher in order to finance not only
the previous deficit but the real interest service on the larger
remunerated debt.In consequence, the inflation rate must be
higher, as well as the real interest rate since the re.l stock of
debt is higher and depositors in the banks should be induced to
hold the extra deposits with which to finance the extra
government debt (call it remunerated reserve requirements  or
Treasury Bills held by banks or compulsory bank investments,
etc.).
VII.  THE  EXTERNAL  EFFECTS  OF PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEFICITS
The external effects of the public sector deficits can be
analyzed in a two-step process: first, the effects of the fiscal
deficit on the level of aggregate spending and therefore on the
trade balance deficit and. second, the effects of the changes in
aggregate spending, measured by the trade balance on the real
exchange rate. Additional side effects are those of portfolio
shifts induced by changes in the rate of inflation that result in
changes in the desired rate of accumulation of foreign assets and
therefore on the Trade Balance. Finally, the rate of government
spending may also affect the Real Exchange Rate if the government
has a different propensity to consume non-traded goods than the
private sector.
We shall first discuss the process of determination of the
real exchange rate and then continue with the analysis of the
fundamental determinants of the Trade Balance.
56VII.1 The Theoretical Framework for the Determination of the Real
Exchange Rate.
Consider an economy with three broad aggregates of goods:
exportables, import competing and non-traded,with nominal prices
Px, Pm and Ph respectively. The concept of the Real Exchange Rate
intends to be a measure of some aggregate of nominal prices of
traded goods (Px and Pm) in terms of non-traded goods (Ph). In
general, however, this economy must have two relevant relative
prices :  Px/Ph and Pm/ph, to which we shall refer as the export
and import real exchange rates (RERX and RERM respectively).
Being relative prices, both RERX and RERM are endogenously
determined. As such, they cannot be considered as policy
variables. It is the case, however, that for a given
(equiproportional) change in the equilibrium values of the RER's,
an accommodation can be made in the nominal exchange rate so that
the RER's get to their new equilibrium values without need for
variations in domestic prices of non-traded goods.  It is also
the case that a nominal exchange rate policy that indexes  this
nominal variable to some aggregate price level may force the RER
measures to depart from their equilibrium levels for long periods
of time.,/It  is important, therefore, to have available a
structueal model of determination of the equilibrium values of
the RER so that nominal exchange rate policy does not force this
previous studies on Real Exchange Rate determination in Argentina
were done in Cavallo and Peha( 1984), Diaz-Alejandro(1981) and
Rodriguez and Sjaastad(1979)./ 
The model used here follows the one presented in
Rodriguez(1989).  Basically this model assumes that for internal
balance to be achieved, there must be an equilibrium relation
between the three nominal prices and the rate  of nominal
spending. Such relation can be interpreted as the condition for
equilibrium in the market for non-traded goods.In functional
form, such equilibrium can be expressed as:
(VII.1)  Dh(Ph,  Pm,  Px).A  - Sh(Ph,Pm,Px).Y  = 0 ,  where
A: nominal rate of Absorption
Y: Nominal Income
ts= (Y-A)/Y :  Trade Balance surplus normalized by GDP.
where Dh(.) is the fraction of total absorption of goods devoted
to the purchase of non-traded goods and Sh is the fraction of the
value of the output of non-traded goods in the total nominal GDP.
57:n (VII.1)  we have assumed that supply and demand for non-
traded goods are homogeneous of degree one with respect to the
levels of nominal output or absorption respectively.
Since (VII.1)  must be homogeneous of degree zero in all
nominal variables, we can deflate by Ph to obtain:
(VII.2)
Dh{Pm/Ph,  (Px/Pm).(Pm/Ph)).(1-ts)  =  Sh(Pm/Ph,(Pm/Px).(Px/Pm))
or:
(VII.3)
RERM =  G{ (Pm/Px), ts).
In logarithmic form, (VII.3)  can be expressed as:
(VII.  4)
Log(RERM)  = Co +  w.Log(Pm/Px)  +  z.ts.
Since Log(RERM) =  Log(Pm/Ph), we can interpret (VII.4)  as
the equation determining the equilibrium value of Ph given the
exogenous values of Px, Pm and ts. Both Px and Pm are determined
by foreign prices and.commercial policy, whereas ts is determined
by macroeconomic varia6les related to the equilibrium rate of
foreign savings (to be analyzed later).  From this perspective,
we expect w to be positive and between zero and one, as it is the
elasticity of Ph with respect to an increase in the nominal price
of exports, holding ts and Pm constant (a detailed analysis of
these relationships may be seen, among others, in Sjaastad(1978),
Dornbusch(1974) or  Harberger(1988)).
Since RERM= RERX.(Px/Pm) it follows that (VII.4)  can also
be expressed as:
(VII.5)  Log(RERX)= Co + (1-w).(log(Px/Pm)  +  z.ts.
In general, we expect the parameter z to be positive,  as
it represents the effect on Ph of an increase in absorption
relative to income (as some extra spending falls on Qht;  Ph raises
and thus RERX and RERM must fall; in terms of (11), as ts rises,
absorption falls and so does Ph,  from where it follows that z
must be positive).
58In general, it is usual to refer to THE Real Exchange
Rate, this being defined as the relative price of some average
price of traded goods. Assume this average is formed in the
following way:
(VII.6) Log(PTA)= a.Log(Px) +  (1-a).Log(Pm).
The Average Real Fxchange Rate would then be:
(VII.7)  Log(AVRER)  =  a.Log(Px)  +  (1-a).Log(Pm)  - Log(Ph)
Since  Log(Ph)  = -Co+  w.Log(Px)  +  (1-w).Log(Pm)  - z.ts,  we
can substitute it into (VII.7) to obtain:
(VII.8)  Log(AVRER)  =  Co +  z.ts +(a-w).Log(Px/Pm).
It follows from (VII.8)  that if the aggregation parameter
a" is chosen identical to the structural parameter w, then the
AVRER will not depend on the terms of trade or commercial policy.
In general, depending on the aggregation weights used, an average
RER could depend on the terms of trade in any conceivable way.
Assume now that the government also demands non-traded goods
in a proportion  Gh.Ag, where Gh is the share of expenditure of
the government in non-traded goods and Ag is total spending done
by the government. Market equilibrium is now given by:
(VII.9)  Dh.Ap  +  Gh.Ag  =  Sh
where Ap is the level of private sector absorption.
Defining the total level of absorption as A =  Ap +  Ag, it
follows that all of the prior analysis is still valid if Gh is
identically  equal to Dh, e.g. if the demand of the government is
identical to the demand of the private sector. If Gh > Dh, an
increase in government spending, for a constant total absorption,
implies that the demand for non-traded goods will raise and
therefore the RER must fall (there  has been a shift in the
composition of absorption towards the sect.or  with the higher
propsr;sity  to consume non-traded goods). Conversely, ,if  Gh<Dh, an
increase in government spending, for constant total absorption,
will mean a higher equilibrium RER. In consequence,  the relation
between the RER and the rate of government spending is subject to
empirical determination.
59Ihe final expression to be tested empirically,
incorporating the possibility of government spending at a rate
different from the private sector is therefore:
(VII.10)  Log(RERM) = Co +  w.Log(Pm/Px) +  z.ts +  e.Ag
where the sign of E  is the same as the sign of the difference
between the government and the private sector propensities to
consume non-traded goods. If the government has a higher demand
for N-T goods than the private sector, an increase in governrnent
spending for a given level of total demand implies a shiFt in
demand towards N-T goods and therefore a fall in the ir,ort real
exchange rate.
Unfortunately, we do not have available quarterly or
monthly series of government spending so we were restricted to
the use of annual data for the period 1964-87.  The results below
show the estimation of the structural relation for the import
real exchange rate. This variable is constructed as the ratio of
the imported component of the Wholesale price index to the
Consumer Price Index:
LRERM= Log(Price of Imports from WPI/Consumer Price Index).
The explanatory variables are:
(1) TSGDP: Ratio of the Trade Account Balance to GDP (since  the
Trade Account is denominated in dollars, the nominal GDP was
converted into dollars using the official exchange rate for
commercial transactions from the  FIEL data bank). The expected
sign of the effect of this variable on RERM is Dositive.
(2) Internal terms of trade (in logarithm:LPXM:Log(PX/PM),  equal
to the ratio of the agricultural component of the WPI to the
imported component of the same price index.  This variable
incorporates the substitution effects due to the external terms
of trade and of taxes and subsidies to foreign trade. The
expected sign of the effect of this variable on RERM = PM/PH is
negative (a raise in PX raises PH by a smaller proportion and
thus reduces PM/PH).
(3) Government spending, captured by the ratio of nominal
government spending to nominal GDP. The expected signr  of this
variable is negative under the reasonable assumption that the
government has a larger  propensity to consume non-traded goods
than the private sector.
60The empirical results show that all the three?  variables
iave the expected signs and are highly  significant in the
determination of the Import Real Exchange Rate of Argentina. The
trade surplus coefficient equals 0.07 indicating that a 1%
percentage point increase in the trade surplus to GDP ratio is
associated with a 7% increase in the import real exchange rate.
The coefficient of the internal terms of trade is approximately
equal to 0.5. This means that a 10% raise in the price of imports
(or of exports) results in a 5% raise in the CPI that is  our
measure of the Non-Traded goods price index. Finally, the
coefficient of the ratio of government spending to GDP is  equal
to -0.02 meaning that a one percent increase in this ratio is
associated with a 2% decrease in the real exchange rate. This
result implies that the government has a higher propensity to
spend in Non-Traded goods than the private sector.
In order to correct for simultaneous determination bias the
regression was estimated with two stage least squares.
Instrumental variables were used for the trade surplus to GDP
ratio  (instruments where the current and lagged primary deficit
of the public sector, lagged trade balance to GOP ratios and
current and lagged remaining explanatory variables). All of the
coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 2%
confidence level or less.  Figure 14 shows the actual relation
between the Trade balance to GDP ratio and  the import real
exchange rate (both varlables are normalized by their means).
Since the late 1970's, the Argentine foreign debt rose
from a negligible level up to close to 100% of GDP (in 1990,  when
the debt, including the arrears accumulated since 1988 reached a
level of 66 billion dollars). Servicing this debt would require a
Trade Surplus of about 10% of GDP just for the nominal interest
(assuming an interest rate of 10% per year, and the additional
assumption that the government, who is the main debtor, has a
fiscal surplus large enough to purchase the requ;red trade
surplus in order to pay its debt).
According to our regression results, generating  a TSGDP of
10% as required for the full servicing of the nominal interest  on
the  Argentine foreign debt would imply a real exchange rate 70%
higher than the one prevailing in the absence of the need to
service the external debt. The fact is,  however, that the real
exchange rate is in 1989 at similar levels  than the one§ that
prevailed in the early 1970's when the debt was non-existent,
partly a reflection of the fact that Argentina has not serviced
her external debt since 1988.
61Other factors also have worked towards the maintenance of a
relatively low real exchange rate, particularly the increase in
real government spending that, according to our results, is
biased towards non-traded goods and therefore tends to lower the
equilibrium real exchange rate. Government spending as a fraction
of GDP has increased from about 27% in the early 70's to 43% in
1987, after having reached a maximum of 56% of GDP in 1983.
According to the empirical results in Table 13, each additional
point of GDP in government spending is associated with 2.1% fall
in the real exchange rate.
62TABLE  13 : REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE  DETERMINATION
SIIPL 1964  1997
24  Obseruations
Instrunent  list:  C TSGDP(-1) TSGDP(-2) PD PD(-1)  LPXI1  LPX1(-1)  TEGDP
ThCDP(  1)
Conuergence  achlieued  after  4  iterations
C  5.1585599  8.2979595  17,312952  0,008
TSGDP  0.0713868  080290358  2.4585765  8.024
LPXt  -0.4925328  081745254  -2.8221277  8.011
TEGDP  -0.8212179  .08872522 -2.9257233  8.089
A1RM()  0.3487151  0.2224754  1.5674318  0.134
lI-squared  8,612130  ilean  of  dependent  var  4.392887
Adjusted  H-squared  0.530836  S.D.  of  dependent  uar  0.214294
S.E.  of  regression  8.146702  Sun  of  squared  resid  8.409352
Dttrbin-Watson  stat  1.637667  F-statistic  7.5H5894
Log  lIkelIhwod  14.80827
FIGURE  14
RELATION  BETWEEN  THE  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE  AND  THE  TRADE  BALANCE
(NorMalized  Uariables)
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63VII.2  The Trade Balance and the Fiscal Deficit
The deficit of the public sector, as measured by the
Public Sector Borrowing Requirements, is the result of the
difference between government spending and government tax
revenues. It is therefore imperative in describing the effects of
a given deficit to separate the effects of the financing of the
deficit from those derived from the given levels  of government
spending or taxation. In order to do so we have to design a
conceptual experiment. In our case we shall assume that there is
available a neutral tax, e.g. a value added tax or a consumption
tax such that changes in the level of this tax do not affect the
relative structure of demand for goods or assets. The deficit is
then generated by reducing this neutral tax and increasing
accordingly the level of debt financing, either external or
internal. From this perspective, what we will be analyzing is the
effects of tax vs. debt financing in the context of an open
economy. In the case of internal debt financing the government
may resort to issuing interest bearing debt (bon,ds)  or non-
interest bearing debt (money).
The issue of tax vs. debt financinq has received a lot of
attention in the literature in reference to the well known
Ricardian equivalence proposition.  The general thrust of the
Ricardian proposition is that a tax reduction financed with debt
will have no real effects on the economy if the public discounts
the future taxes to service the debt and therefore increases
savings by the exact amount of taxes reduced.  The empirical
validity of the Ricardian equivalence is, however, quite
inconclusive.\l/
-----------------------------------
1/For a survey on issues related to the Ricardian Equivalence see
Leiderman and Blejer(1988).
In the context of an open econon.y,  the real exchange rate
is a crucial relative price for the allocation of resources in
the external sector. This relative price will certainly be
affected by the composition of government spending and may also
be affected, depending on the validity of the Ricardian
equivalence proposition, by the way of financing of such spending
through its effects of the Trade Balance. Next we shall discuss
the general issues involved in the analysis of the Ricardian
equivalence proposition in relation to the external effects of
debt vs. tax financing.  After establishing the theoretical
aspects of the process of determination of the Trade Balance we
shall present empirical estimates of the actual relationships for
the Argentine data.
64We are concerned here with the short run effects of
deficit financing on the levels  of the real exchange rate, The
Trade and Current Account, the levels  of domestic and foreign
indebtedness and, finally, the inflation rate to the extent that
the deficit is financed with money creation.
Define the following variables:
(VII.11)  Y-  GDP
(VII.12) Fpg= Net financing from private sector to government:
Taxes plus acquisition of domestic paper (debt or currency minus
interest collected on domestic debt).
Fpg= T +  dC/dt  +  dD/dt  - i.D
where C represents Money and D Internal Gov.Debt.
(VII.13)  Fep= Net Financing from foreign to private sector:Gross
borrowing minus )nterest paid on foreign private debt.
Fep  =E.dD*p/dt  - i*.E.D*p
where D*p is the external private debt and E the exchange rat,e.
(VII.14)  G= Government spending on goods
(VII.15)  Feg= Net financing from foreign to governmer' sector.
Feg=E.d(D*g)/dt - i*.E.D*g
where D*g is the external government debt.
Private Sector Budget Constraint
(VII.16)  Gp = Y +  Fep -Fpg =  Private spending on goods.
Government Budget constraint
(VII.17)  Gg =  Fpg +  Feg =  Government spending on goods
65Total  Spending  on goods
=  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  _  =  =  =  =  =
(VII.18)  GT =  Gp +  Gg  Y +  Fep +  Feg
Starting  from  (VII.18)  we can  derive  a set of propositions
that will  be the  basis  for the  subsequent  analysis.
PROPOSITION  (1)  TOTAL  SPENDING  ON GOODS  CAN  EXCEED  TOTAL  OUTPUT
-===============  ONLY  IF IT IS EXTERNALLY  FINANCED.  Follows  from
(VII.18)
PROPOSITION  (2)  FOR A GIVEN  COMPOSITION  OF TOTAL  SPENDING  ON
-===========___==  GOODS  BETWEEN  TRADED  AND NON-TRADED,  THE REAL
EXCHANGE  RATE  DEPENDS  ON THE  DIFFERENCE  BETWEEN  TOTAL  SPENDING
AND  TOTAL  OUTPUT  OF GOODS,  I.E.,  ON THE TRADE  BALANCE  DEFICIT
THAT  IS EQUAL  TO THE AMOUNT  OF NET  EXTERNAL  FINANCING.  Follows
from  (VII.10)
PROPOSITION  (3)  G  OVERNMENT  FINANC!1NG STRATEGIES  WILL  AFFECT  THE
-===========-==  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE  ONLY  IF THEY AFFECT  THE TRADE
BALANCE.  Follows  from P2.
PROPOSITION  (4)  GOVERNMENT  FINANCING  STRATEGIES  WILL  AFFECT  THE
TRADE  BALANCE  ONLY  IF THE RICARDIAN  EQUIVALENCE
PROPOSITION  DOES NOT  HOLD.  IF THIS  IS THE CASE A TAX REDUCTION
FINANCED  THOUGH  INCREASED  DEBT  (INTERNAL  OR EXTERNAL)  WILL RESULT
IN SOME  INCREASE  IN PRIVATE  SPENDING.  IN CONSEQUENCE  THE TRADE
SURPLUS  WILL  DETERIORATE  AND  THE  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE  SHOULD  FALL.
WE WOULD  THEREFORE  OBSERVE  THAT  A FISCAL  DEFICIT  GENERATES  A REAL
APPRECIATION.
Proposition  (4)  is our  starting  point  of analysis.  The
relevant  question  is whether  the  government  financing  strategies
can  affect  the  level  of private  spending,  i.e., the  issue of the
crowding  out,  in this  case  referring  also to external  borrowing.
In order  to discuss  the effects  of deficit  financing  on the  real
exchange  rate we have  to define  a neutral  experiment  through
which  the deficit  increase  does not  affect  the  composition  of
total  spending  which,  of course,  would  be a very obvious  way  to
affect  the  real exchange  rate.  The  experiment  will  be a tax
reduction  coupled  by an equivalent  increase  in goverpment
indebtedness  (internal  or external).  In this way, we are  assuming
that a deficit  is generated  without  a corresponding  increase  in
the  rate of government  spending.
66There are three ways to finance such a deficit: increase
domestic debt, increase external debt or increased rate of money
creation. In what follows we shall discuss each case separately.
(a)Tax Reduction financed by external government borrowing
Consider a situation where the government switches from
tax financing to external financing. If the private sector reacts
by investing the tax savings in foreign assets, there will be no
effect on total spending or in the trade surplus. The real
exchange rate will not be affected because government borrowing
was unable to affect the Ti-ade  Balance. In terms of Eqn(8), the
increase in Feg is  matched exactly by a decrease in Fep, so that
their sum remains unchanged.
The above conclusion follows from a straightforward
generalization of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem for foreign
borrowing. This issue was analyzed in the context of an optimal
model by Auernheimer(1987), Leiderman and Blejer.1988), and
Frenkel and Razin (1986), and has some empirical confirmation in
the Argentine experience during 1978-81.
During 1978-81, the Argentine government acquired a
substantial external debt that was to a great extent matched by
private capital outflows. The private capital outflows, however,
took place later in timne  when it was already perceived that the
governments borrowing and exchange rate  policy was dcomed to
failure. There was a transitional period, however, when the
government debt was building up, during which the trade deficit
deteriorated substantially (although  part of it  may have been
due to the trade liberalization that took place coupled with the
cuasi-fixed exchange rate policy being followed).  It is
therefore not clear whether the private capital outflow observed
was a private compensation for the increased government debt or a
simple speculative movement induced by expectations of a large
devaluation.
As mentioned inr  Leiderman and Blejer (op.cit.) there is a
wide variety of reasons why the Ricardian equivalence proposition
may not hold to its full extent, even in the oren economy. Among
these reasons they mention the existence of borrowiny
constraints, distortionary taxation, uncertainty about the
imposition of the required future taxes, differences  Oin  planning
horizons for the private and public  sectors, and we might add
risk induced differentials in rates of interest  at home and
abroad and differences in spending propensities among taxpayers
and bondholders.
67(b) Tax reduction financed by internal borrowing
A similar result regarding substitutability  can be
described if the government deficit is financed with internal
debt. If Ricardian equivalence holds, the lower taxes will be
used by the private sector to acquire the increased internal
issue of debt so that total private spending will not be
increased. There might be, however, indirect  effects due to
portfolio composition effects that may affect the composition of
spending between consumption and investment  goods.
However, if the private sector purchases the internal  debt
with increased foreign indebtedness,  we will observe an increase
in external financing and therefore the trade balance and the
real exchange rate will be affected. In this case the Ricardian
proposition would not hold since private spending has increased
to the exact amount of the tax reduction. Here again, the issue
should be subject to empirical verification: is government
borrowing intermediated externally by the private sector or not?.
This case corresponds to the standard version of the open economy
with perfect international capital mobility, as presented by
Mundell or Fleming in models in  which Ricardian equivalence does
not hold. In this context, any increased  domestic borrowing by
the government will tend to raise the domestic interest rate and
induce private capita,l  inflows in the exact amount of the
government borrowing so that the interest rate remains unchanged.
(c) Tax reduction financed through inflation  tax
This is the most obvious example of neutrality since it
amounts to the subst.tution of a tax by another so that we should
not expect any direct effect on the rate of private spending.
However, a differential tax has been instrumented  on a single
financial asset, money, and this may have short and long run
effects on the desired rates of acquisition  of the other assets,
in particular external assets. The higher inflation rate may
stimulate larger desired holdings of external assets by the
private sector. In the short run this implies larger capital
outflows and therefore, through the reduced rate of private
spending, a larger Trade Surplus (and higher real exchange rate).
In the long run, as foreign private assets are larger,  the
interest income  will be larger. This means that the Trade Surplus
must be lower than otherwise since the interest  earned must be
spent on foreign goods. The long run effect should therefore be
to lower the real exchange rate. The dynamic aspects of
inflationary  financing on the Real Exchange Rate and the Trade
Balance have been analyzed in several works, among which we may
mention: Calvo and Rodriguez(1977), Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982)
and Calvo (1985).
68The above analysis suggests that the non-neutrality of the
deficit in the case of the inflation tax is due to the use of a
non-neutral tax on one domestic asset, namely money, and not to
the validity or lack of  alidity of the Ricardian equivalence
proposition.
General Conclusions
A deficit financed with debt, be it domestic or foreign,
is bound to affect  the Trade Surplus only if the reduced taxes
do affect the rate of private spending. If the private sector
uses the reduced taxes to acquire the new issues  of internal debt
(if the deficit is internally financed) or to acquire foreign
assets (if the deficit is externally financed), there will be no
effects on the rate of private spending and therefore there will
be no relation between the deficit and the Trade Balance or the
real exchange rate. In this case, the Ricardian equivalence
proposition will be valid, and the choice of tax or debt
financing will be totally neutral, also in the case of an open
economy.
Inflationary financing of the deficit will affect the
external sector through the portfolio induced effects on desired
private holdings of foCeign assets. We expect totally opposite
effects of a higher inf.lation  rate on the Trade Balance in the
short run and in the long run. In the short run higher inflation
should improve the Trade Balance while the opposite should be
valid in the long run.
Empirical  Aralysis
The above discussion suggests that the expected rate of
inflation and the real stocks of assets held by the private
sector should be among the variables in the equation of
determination of the Trade Balance, as they are linked  to the
desired rate of accumulation of foreign assets.
Another variable that theoretically belongs in the Trade
Balance equation is the Terms of Trade (Laursen-Metzler  effect).
An improvement in the Terms of Trade increases real income  and
this may induce an increase in the desired stock of forpign
assets to be held.  However, the relation is not that clear since
a debtor country facing an increase in real income may decide it
can support a larger stock of foreign debt. The final answer  on
the relation between the Terms of Trade and the Trade Balance,
therefore, will be empirical.
69The deficit variable chosen consists of the deficit of the
Consolidated Public Sector before any interest service (primary
deficit), this being normalized by GDP. The Terms of Trade series
are from ECLA. There is no series available on the stock of
foreign assets held by argentines. As  proxies we have tried two
variables: (i) the balance on the service account of the Balance
of payments and (ii) a measure of foreign assets held build by
the accumulated sum of Current Account surpluses.
None of the variables trying to capture the effects of the
level of foreign indebtedness turned out to be significant in the
explanation of the Trade Balance. One would expect a positive
sign from the level of foreign debt (or its service) on the trade
balance surplus, indicating that the economy does some adjustment
in order to service its debt.
In Regression Al, the debt service variable has the
correct sign but is not significantly different from zero as the
T-value of only 0.83 shows. In Regression A2 we try the series
generated for the stock of foreign debt by accumulating the past
current account deficits from 1960 onwards (and assuming the
initial level of debt was arbitrarily equal to zero). This
variable (lagged one period in order to represent the initial
level of debt during the current period) also has the correct
sign but again the coefficient is not statistically significant.
This results simply verify the obvious observation that the
Argentine economy has not paid up its external debt and therefore
has not faced up the need to adjust the level of the external
trade surplus.
It turns out that only two of the variables, inflation  and
the Fiscal Deficit are significant in the explanation of the
Trade Surplus. In both cases the coefficients of the variables
have the theoretically expected signs and are significantly
different from zero at the 2% or less confidence level.  Higher
current inflation improves the trade balance surplus (it is not
possible to illustrate the opposite long run effect because of
the insignificance of the coefficient of the foreign assets held)
in accordance to what is theoretically expected from the
portfolio model discussed before. The primary deficit of the CPS
is shown to deteriorate the trade balance surplus, as expected in
an economy where the Ricardian equivalence propositicn is not
fully valid. The coefficient value of 0.32 indic.ates  that one
third of the value of a primary fiscal deficit results in a trade
deficit. The trade deficit in turn requires a lower real exchange
rate (a real appreciation)  for the home goods market to clear.
We therefore find a negative relationship between the real
exchange rate and the primary deficit of the CPS.
70TABLE  14  TRADE  BALANCE  REGRESSIONS
LIST  OF  VARIABLES:
TSGDP:  Trade  Balance  Surplus  to GDP  ratio.
INF: December  to December  inflation  rate  in CPI.
PD: Primary  Deficit  to GDP  ratio  of the CPS.
FASGDP:  Ratio  of Foreign  Assets  to GDP  (built accumulating
Current  Account  Surpluses).
SERGDP:  Ratio  of  the Service  Account  Surplus  to GDP.
MU:Rate  of expansion  in Ml  (instrumental  variable  for  inflation).
All  regression  were  done with  two  stage  least squares  in order  to
correct  for  the simultaneous  determination  of TSGDP  and  inflation
(PD,  FASGDP  and  SERGDP  were  considered  as exogenous  variables).
REGRESSION  (1)
SMPL 1963  - 1988
26  Observations
Instrunent  list:  C  SERGDP  IMF(-1)  PD  PD(-1)  lii  IU(-D
C  1.6313156  0,7027608  2.3212957  0.030
SERGDP  0.1447856  0.1725432  0.8391266  8.410
IMF  ,0,894151 8.0037333  2.5219420  019i9
PD  -0.2884181  0.1331306 -2.2163746 0,83
B-squared  0.489888 Mean  of  dependent  uar  1.921335
Adjusted  B-squared  0.420327 S.D.  of  dependent  uar  2,829074
S.E.  of  regression  1.544861 Sun  of  squared  resid  52.50513
Durbin-Watson stat  1.597045 F-statistic  7,042588
Log  likelihood  -46.028q9
71REGRESSION  (2)
SMPL  1963 - 1900
26  Obseruations
Instrunent  list:  C FASGDP(-1)  ltF(-1)  PD  PD(-I)  MU  MU(-1)
MTflTrW  U  COEtFICIEMIT  STU.  EHH14014  T-TOT.,  '  ?-TflIL  i(1_
C  1.9033460  0.7615012  2.499203  0.020
FASGDP(-1)  -0.0049962  0.i534776  -0.934258  0.926a
11fF  00114581  9.036119  3.1723557  0.904
PD  -0.3277107  0.1460646  -2.2436013  0.035
B-squared  0.433926  Mean  of  dependent  uar  1.921335
Adjusted  B-squared  0.356734  S.D.  of  dependent  uar  2.029074
S.E.  of  regression  1.627396  Sun  of  squared  resid  58.26522
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.653531  F-statistic  5.621306
Log  likellihood  -47.38222
REGRESSION  (3)
^  ~~~TA  o  Dependeiit,  Uarlable i-. IS(ADI' 
SIIPL 1963  - 1988
26 Observations
Instrument list:  C IMFR(-1)  PD  PD(-I) MI  M(-1)
C  1,9422587  9.6129288  3.1688161  9.004
IMF  0.8113377  8.0024997  4.5355624  0.000
PD  -Q,3247722  0.1193733  -2,7206441  8.012
B-squared  8.  43S699  Mean  of dependent  uar  1.921335
AdJusted  R-squared  0.386532  S.D.  of dependent  uar  2.029074
S.E. of regression  1.589257  Sun  of squared  resid  58.09196
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.b54023 F-statistic  8.875948
Log  I  Ikel  Ihood  -47.34358
72VIII.  GENERAL  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
Argentina has had a sad economic history in recent decades,
and the behaviur of her public sector may have been instrumental
in that process. In this paper we discuss the role of government
spending, taxation and deficit financing on the rest of the
Argentine economy.
Government spending grew systematically faster than GDP
until the final crisis of the Argentine economy started to
develop in 1982. Since then it has started to fall, due more to
resource constraints than to deliberate political action.
The fall in the relative size of government spending came
too late, however, to avoid the financial crisis which brought
the country ir,to  a state of hyperinflation in 1989.
The government run a primary deficit (not including any
interest payments) every year from 1961 to 1989. In consequence,
the government had to resort to the issuing  money and interest-
bearing debt. This in turn resulted in a systematic tendency of
the economy to experience high real interest rates and inflation.
A permanent positive primary deficit, coupled with high real
interest rates and a stagnant economy would lead, it seems, to an
ever growing stock of public debt in relation to GDP. Real
government debt did not grow continuously, however, because every
once in a while the existing stock of debt would be melted down
by outbursts of inflation driven by the large devaluations
accompanying a foreign exchange crisis.
Revenues of the consolidated non-financial public sector
(CPS) have historically shown a growing trend similar to that of
expenditures, while being systematically below them. This high
growth in fiscal revenues in the face of a stagnant economy
should be enough to invalidate the commonly held claim that the
basic problem in Argentina is that the private sector does not
pay taxes. The fact of the matter is that not only fiscal
pressure is very high, but it has also grown at a much faster
rate than that of GDP in the last 25 years. It is the case that
even though fiscal pressure has been high, fiscal spqnding has
also grown and has systematically exceeded revenues during the
three decades covered by this study.
The Central Bank has been an additional source of public
73spending, due to loans to thie  financial system which could never
be recovered, different "exchange-insurance" mechanisms
occasionally used to attract short term foreign financing, the
purchase of foreign-exchange reserves and the bailout of failing
financial institutions. Since 1977 the Central Bank has also had
a system of remunerated reserve requirements, which has produced
a significant cuasifiscal expenditure, and which is at the root
of the hyperinflationary process recently developed.
The Inflationary Financing of the Deficit
Because of doubts about the quality of public-sector
accounting, we measured the fraction of the deficit that was
financed with money creation directly from the accounts of the
monetary sector, subtracting changes in foreign-exchange
reserves.
From 1964 through,  1975 the deficit of the CPS did not exceed
sianificantly the revenue from money creation. This means that
the fiscal deficit was mainly financed through monetary creation
rather than issuing debt. The situation changes drastically from
1976 onwards when debt financing becomes a significant part of
the total. This change coincides with the fall of the Peronist
Government and the initi-ation  of a military regime. The period
1977-79 is characterized by foreign borrowing and the revenue
from money creation  falls well below historical levels. The
banking crisis of early 1980 set the end to this stage of foreign
financing of the deficit and opens the way for the next stage of
internal debt financing that lasts up to 1985. From 1985 onwards
starts a serious effort of reduction of the total deficit of the
CPS. The use of the inflation tax, however, does not fall
proportionately to the deficit of the CPS because of the
increasing finar,cing  pressures of the service of the internal
debt concentrated mostly in the Central Pank.
Over our sample period authorities have used the inflation
tax to finance primary expenditures while interest expenditures
that result from the stock of Government Debt have tended to be
refinanced through the issue of more interest-bearing  debt.
Our regression study provides a structural framework for the
relation between the Public Sector Deficit and inflation.  A 1%
point of Primary Deficit is financed with 0.7% of revenue from
money creation (the rest with debt), and the effect of collecting
this revenue from money creation is around 67.9% of additional
inflation.
74Public Debt and the Structure of Financial Markets
The government has gradually become the "borrower of first
resort" of the economy and as a consequence most of the financial
assets of the private sector are either directly or indirectly
the result of loans to the public sector (except, of course, the
holdings of foreign exchange).
Practically all of the Central Bank debt is directly held by
commercial banks under the form of compulsory reserve
requirements ("depositos indisponibles") or, at times, under
voluntary holdings of  Central Bank's CD's. The commercial banks,
in turn, obtain their funds by raising interest-bearing  deposits
from the public. What we therefore observe in practice is a
system in which most of the public's deposits at commercial banks
are lent to the Central Bank and used to finance the fiscal
deficit. Part of the deposits of the public have been lent to the
private sector, but that has been gradually displaced in favor of
lending to the Central Bank: most of the lending capacity
generated by the public's demand for M2 is absorbed in the form
of domestic liabilities of the Central Bank.
The pressure put on the financial markets by the government
debt is best captured by evaluating this debt at the commercial
exchange rate. Normally authorities try to stabilize the economy
by fixing the exchange rate at the level given by the commercial
rate. As credibility in the plan decreases, interest rates raise
and the stock of government debt tends to raise in terms of
dollars.  When the stock of debt, particularly the short term
debt of the Central Bank, gets out of line with the available
reserves, pressures mount against the currency and a devaluation
finally follows. Normally devaluations are successful in reducing
the dollar value of the government debt denominated in Australes
but not so much in reducing the interest rates in dollar
equivalent paid on the remaining stock. As a consequence,
immediately after the devaluation the remaining stock of debt
continues raising at rates far beyond the level consistent with a
fixed exchange rate and a new crisis starts to develop.
The Demand for Money and the Limits to the Inflatio- Tax
From 1960 to 1974 velocity remained approximately stable in
the range of 6-7. In 1975 velocity starts an upward trend that
does not show signs of stopping, taking it to a value of 33 in
751988. Unofficial data estimates put velocity around 50 as of the
second half of 1989, after the hyperinflation of June-July of
that year. The raise of 1975-76 may have been caused by the high
price instability during those two years; we have reasons to
believe, however, that a structural change took Dlace in 1977,
when interest rates were totally freed for the first time in
decades and the public could invest in short term time deposits
at market determined interest rates.
The estimates from the monthly data yield long-run  estimates
of the semi-log elasticity which imply a monthly revenue-
maximizing inflation rate between 33 and 35%. The regression
using annual data yields a revenue-maximizing rate of 21.9% per
month, equivalent to 966% per year. The associated maximum
revenue from money creation is equal to 7.4% of GDP and velocity
at this inflation rate takes the value of 35.5
Public Debt and Interest Rate Determination
The interest rate appears to be determined by the short run
liquidity available in the financial system.
The magnitude of-the changes in the interest rate needed to
accommodate fluctuaticons  in the demand for deposits is bound to
depend on the interest-elasticity  of such demand. In our analysis
we assumed that the real demand for deposits depends on the
current-month nominal interest rate and the expected inflation
rate.
In all our regressions the sign of the nominal interest
rates and inflation rate is equal to what one expect
theoretically: the nominal interest rates come out as positive
and the inflation rate comes out as negative with absolute value
equal to that of the interest rate.
The semi-log interest elasticity with respect to the monthly
real interest rate is about 1.1 in the short run and 11 in the
long run. These estimates mean that a 10% fall in the demand fof
deposits requires, for them to be rolled-over,  an increase  od 9
percentage points in the monthly interest-rate in the short run
an 0.9 percentage points in the long run.
Regression results assessing the link between the BONEX rate
and the stock of internal government debt indicate  a strong
76effect. In the long run, a 10% increase in the dollar value of
the government debt results in an increase of 3.2 percentage
points in the annual BONEX rate.
The external interest rate, measured by the monthly US prime
rate did not come out as significant in our regressions.
External Effects of Public Sector Deficits
The empirical results show that the trade surplus to GDP
ratio, the internal terms of trade and the government spending to
GDP ratio are highly significant in the determination of the
Import Real Exchange Rate in Argentina. The trade-surplus
coefficient equals 0.07 indicating that a 1% percentage point
increase in the trade surplus to GDP ratio is associated with a
7% increase in the import real exchange rate. The coefficient  of
the internal terms of trade is approximately equal to 0.5. This
means that a 10% raise in the price of imports (or of exports)
results in a 5% raise in the CPI, that is  our measure of the non-
traded goods price index. Finally, the coefficient of the ratio
of government spending to GDP is equal to -0.02, meaning that a
one percent increase in this ratio is associated with a 2%
decrease in the real exchange rate. This result implies that the
government has a higher-propensity to spend in  Non-Traded goods
than the private sector;
According to our regression results, generating a trade
surplus to GDP ratio of 10%, as required for the full servicing
of the nominal interest on the Argentine foreign debt, would
imply a real exchange rate 70% higher than the one prevailing in
the absence of the neei *to  service the external debt. The fact
that the real exchange rate was in 1989 at similar levels than
the ones prevailing in the early 1970's, when the debt was non-
existent, is partly a reflection of the fact that Argentina has
not:  serviced her external debt since 1988.
Other factors that have also worked towards the maintenance
of a relatively low real exchange rate, particularly the increase.
in real government spending which, according to our results, is
biased towards non-traded goods and therefore tends to induce a
lower equilibrium real exchange rate. Government spend-ng, as a
fraction of GDP, has increased from about 27% in the early 70's
to 43% in 1987, after having reached a maximum of 56% of GDP in
1983. According to our empirical results, each additional point
of GDP in government spending is associated with 2.1% fall in the
real exchange rate.
77Only two variables, inflation and the fiscal deficit, are
significant in the explanation of the trade surplus. Higher
current inflation improves the trade balance surplus in
accordance with the model discussed in this paper. The primary
deficit of the CPS is shown to deteriorate the trade balance
surplus, as expected in an economy where the Ricardian
equivalence proposition is not fully valid. The coefficient value
of 0.32 indicates that one third of the value of a primary fiscal
deficit results in a trade deficit. The trade deficit in turn
requires a lower real exchange rate (a real appreciation) for the
home goods market to clear. We therefore find a negative
relationship between the real exchange rate and the primary
deficit of the CPS.
78APPENDIX
The Fiscal Deficit and Private Savings and Investment
This part of our study complements the asset market discussion by
assessing the impact of fiscal policy variables on private saving
and investment.
Private Consumption
The question we address here is how Argentine private
consumption reacts to an increase in the public sector needs of
financing (deficit), due to either an increase in  public
expenditure, or a decrease in public revenue. A critical issue to
discuss in this context is whether domestic public debt can or
cannot be considered net private wealth in Argentina. As-uming
rational economic behavior, the question becomes whether capital
market imperfections are strong enough to produce net private
wealth effects from changes in public financing strategies (debt
vs.  taxes).
Due to data limitations,  what we present here is a
simplified version of.the framework proposed in the project. It
consists in the estimation of a private-consumption function,
which depends on fiscal expenditures and revenues.
In contrast to the usual practice, we do not include the
real interest rate as an argument of the consumption function.
Between the forties and the early seventies there was nearly
permanent financial repression in Argentina, rendering the
government-imposed interest rate (charged in the formal financial
market for rationed credit) meanirgless from a resource-
allocation point of view. Tnis situation changed after the
financial reform of 1977, wnich eliminated the old direct
regulation of credit. As we argue in another section, however,
the interest rate in local currency, determined in a financial
market working with a horizon of seven days or less, reflects
basically the state of short-run liquidity rather than the
intertempora, trade-offs faced by economic agents in Argentina.
Data
In the regressions reported below we have used the
Fundacion Mediterranea 1913-1984 annual database. The original
variables taken from that database were:
79PBIPM:  GNP at market prices (real)
CONSUMP:  Private Consumption (real)
GGN:  National Government Expenditures (nominal)
IGN:  National Government Revenues (nominal)
PPBICF:  GNP implicit prices (factor costs)
Using the GNP Implicit Prices (PPBICF) series as deflator, we
constructed the National Government real expenditure (RGGN)  and
revenue (RIGN) series.
Regressions
To account for the structural change, all the regressions
were done for the entire database sample, 1914-1984, and for
1960-1984 period. The private consumption functions we estimated
are the following:
Equation #1  1914-1984
CONSUMP(t) =
50.51  +0.79PBIPH(t-1)  - 61.08RGGN(t-1)  - 22.51RIGN(t-1)
4.21) (17.80)  (-2.79)  (-0.66)
R**2  .98  RBAR**2  .98
DURBIN-WATSON  1.36
Equation $2  1960-1984
CONSUMP(t)
176.81  +  0.70PBIPM(t-1)  - 46.18RGGN(t-1)  - 38.70RIGN(t-1)
(3.11)  (9.88)  (-1.62)  (-0.83)
R**2  .927  RBAR**2  .916
DURBIN-WATSON  1.98
In both regressions  only public expenditure has  a
coefficient significantly different from zero. Furthermore, such
a coefficient is negative as we would expect either from a simple
80wealth effect or from combined wealth and substitution effects.
Government revenue has no significant effect, which is consistent
with the Ricardian hypothesis.
Correcting for first-order autocorrelation does not change
our results. Only public expenditure has a significant, negative
impact on private consumption.
Given that both the consumption and fiscal series are
quite autocorrelated, we have also tried the alternative
procedure of normalizing the private consumption and public
expenditure and revenue data with GNP. The normalized variables
are:
ncon 1913:1 1984:1  =  consump(T)/pb,pm(T)
nggn 1913:1 1984:1  =  100*(ggn(T)/ppbicf(T))/pbipm(T)
nign 1913:1 1984:1  =  100*(ign(T)/ppbicf(T))/pbipm(T)
In this case we have included the one-period lagged  value
of normalized private consumption, and bcth past and current
values of normalized government expenditure and revenue, as
explanatory variables. The ordinary least squares regression
estimates for both sample periods are the following:
Equation #3  1914-1984
NLON(t) = 0.49 +  0.46NCON(t-1)
(5.44)  (4.75)
+  0.03NGGN(t) - 0.72NGGN(t-1)
(0.12)  (-2.30)
- 0.10NIGN(t)  +  0.08NIGN(t-1)
(-0.24)  (0.21)
R**2:  .58  RBAP**2 : .55
DURBIN-WATSON  1.85
*******************t  -*******************************************
81iquation  #4  1960-1984
NCON(t) - 0.36 +  0.53NCON(t-1)
(2.89)  (3.82)
+  0.41NGGN(t)  - 0.86NGGN(t-1)
(1.74)  (-3.76)
- 0.25NIGN(t)  +  0.59NIGN(t-1)
(-0.88)  (1.64)
R**2  .673  RBAR**2  .587
DURBIN-WATSON  2.078
Again, the lagged value of public expenditure has a
negative impact  on private consumption, while public revenue
shows no statistically significative effect.  Based on this
evidence, it would be temptirg to declare Argentina a Ricardian
economy. That is not possible, however, because in Argentina
changes in (ronventional) tax revenues have been normally
associated wiLh changes in inflation-tax revenue. To see this
fact, we have regressed the revenue from money creation, computed
as INFT(t) = (M1(t)-M1(t-1))/PPBICF(t),  against the Government
deficit (DEF=RGGN-RItM), obtaining the following results:
Equation #5  1915-1984
**  ****  ******  ***  ****  ****  *****  ******  *******************t**********
INFT(t) = 0.12 +  0.78DEF(t)
(2.11)  (9.55)
AR(1, =  0.56
R**2  .866  RBAR**2  .864
DURBIN-WATSON  2.07
As equation #5 shows, a substantial fraction of the
Government deficit, as conventionally measured, has been financed
by money creation. Actually, as it has been explained )n other
section of this work, only in the seventies it became common
practice to finance the deficit in the capital markets. As
equation #6 shows, about 90% of the deficit seems to have been
financed with money creation between 1914 and 1970.
82Equation #6  1914-1970
INFT(t) = 0.03 +  0.90DEF(t)
(0.79)  (7.00)
AR(1) =  0.53
R**2  .762  RBAR**9  .758
DURBIN-WATSON  2.08
Clearlv, the traditional choice in Argentine public
finances was, for most of this century, between conventional
taxes and the inflation tax, and no between conventional taxes
and debt, as a test of the Ricardian hypothesis would require.
Equation #7 below shows very neatly the shift to debt
financing in the seventies. As we have discussed elsewhere, the
shift can be dated in 1977. Unfortunately, lack of private
consumption data with a quarterly frequency prevents us from
testing the Ricardian hypothesis for the only period (the last 12
years) for which it would really make sense to test it.
Equation #7  1970-1984
INFT(t)  0.49 +  0.62DEF(t)
(4.07)  (5.55)
AR(1)  =  0.05
R**2  .707  RBAR**2  .682
DURBIN-WATSON  2.09
Taking into account the importance oi inflationary finance
in Argentina, we have also estimated equations #1 and #2
computirig  the revenue from money creation as part of the total
tax revenues of the Argentine "overnment. In this form we make
sure that any change in "revenues,"  given public expenditure,
must mean a change in public debt. In equations #8 and #9 below,
the variable TAX is the sum of conventional public revenues
(RIGN) and the revenue from money creation (INFT).
83Equatiorn #8  1915-1984
CONSUMP(t)  76.55  +  0.69PBIPM(t-1)
(4.35)  (15.54)
- 110.39RGGN(t-1)  +  81.63TAX(t-1)
(-3.13)  (2.26)
AR(1)  = 0.37
R**2  .986  RBAR**2  .986
DURBIN-WATSON  2.1
Equation  #9  1961-1984
CONSUMP(t)  = 259.42  4  0.54PBIPM(t-1)
(2.74)  (5.40)
-116.07RGGN(t-1)  4  109.70TAX(t-1)
(-2.08)  (1.61)
AR(1)  = 0.26
R**2  .922  RBAR**2  .911
DURBIN-WATSON  1.998
we again  observe  the negative  impact  of public  spending.
The  revenue  variable,  TAX,  is significantly  different  from  zero,
but  it is positive,  which  probably  captures  the exk;nsionary
effect  of moriey  creation,  rather  than the  contractionary  effect
that  the  inflation  tax would  produce  if the Ricardian  hypothesis
were  not valid.
C.2.  Private  I_vestment
In this section  we expect  to find  a negative  impact of
deficit  financing  on  investment,  due to rising  domestic  interest
rates,  or stricter  credit  rationing  in the case of financial
repression.
Data
We use  here  the same  database  described  in the section  on
consumption  behavior.  The additional  original  variables  taken
from  that database  were:
84INVEST:  aggregate investment
INVSTGOB: government investment
PUBCON:  public consumption
From aggregate (INVEST) and government (INVSTGOB)
investment we calculated private investment (PINV),  and
normalized private investment (NPINV) as follows:
PINV  = INVEST  - INVSTGOB
NPINV = PINV/PBIPM
Regressions
Following a similar procedure to that used with
consumption, we regressed normalized private investment against
the normalized fiscal variables.
The results of regressing normalized private investment
against current normalized public expenditure and revenue, for
the 1914-1984 sample, are the following:
Equation #10  1914-1984
NPINV(t)  0.78NPINV(t-1)  - 0.1ONGGN(t) +  0.49NIGN(t)
10.49  (-0.73)  (2.45)
R**2  .67  RBAR**2  .66DURBIN-WATSON  1.58
As we expected, there is a significant positive impact  of public
revenue on private investment. Given public expenditure, an
increase in public revenue reduces the deficit and this has a
positive impact on investment. Since we saw in the consumption
module that changes in public revenue do not have effects on
private consumption, and hence on private saving, it is likely
that the positive impact on investment comes from a freer or
perhaps just a smoother working of the capital market. The
introduction of lagged valies of public revenue and expenditure
does not c-hange  the conclusion in any fundamental way.
Equation #11 below shows the results of regressing normalized
private investment against the current valuec of normalized
public expenditure and revenue for the 1960-1984 sample period.
85Equation #11  1960-1984
NPINV(t) = 0.70NPINV(t-1) +  0.02NGGN(t) +  0.48NIGN(t)
(3.71)  (0.11)  (1.45)
R**2  .238  RBAR**2  .169DURBIN-WATSON  1.77
We can see that the results are considerably weaker than
for the larger sample. The coefficient of revenue still has the
right sign, and has a substantially larger t-statistics value. It
is not, however, significantly different from zero at a 5%
significance level.
Both in equations #10 an #11 the coefficient of public
spending turns out to be not significant. To see if aggregation
made a difference, we regressed private investment against public
consumption and government investment.  Equations #12 and #13
below show the results. Again, as we observed with normalized
variables, public revenue has a significant positive impact  on
private investment.  The difference comes here from the
expenditure side: public consumption has, for both sample
periods, a significant negative impact on private investment.
Contrary to what one would expect, if we were to assume that
government investmenV-is bound to produce positive externalities
on private economic activity (as it definitely did in the XIX
century with the railroads), government investment has no
significant effect on private investment.
Equation #12  1915-1984
PINV(t)  - 14.87  +  0.24PBIPM(t-1)  - 1.35PUBCON(t-1)
(-1.26)  5.28  (-2.72)
+  39.07RIGN(t-1)  +  0.24INVSTGOB(t-1)
(1.77)  (0.52)
AR(1) = 0.42
R**2  .947  RBAR**2  .944
DURBIN-WATSON  1.85
86[Qt,2t  lurl  $419  1961  19q4
PINV(  t)  -6.  '  - . 23PBFI  MlP  t - 1  - 1  .99PUBCON(t-1)
(1.16)  (3.29)  (-  3.15)
4  4,.815RIG 1(  t-  14  0 .49IIU'10STGOB(t-1
( 1  .37)  (0.68)
AR(l)  0.20
R**2  .789  RBAR**2  .745
DURBIN-WATSONI  1 .93
t*****t*****t***************  *****$***8****************************
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